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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, section 3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is an Agreement between the Utah Golf Association, Inc. (the 
"UGA") and the City of North Salt Lake (the "City"), and the City of North Salt Lake, 
Utah, Municipal Building Authority (the "Municipal Building Authority"1), ultra vires 
and unenforceable where the City agreed to transfer public property without receiving in 
exchange a present benefit that reflects fair market value of the property to be transferred? 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's 
ruling on the issue. R. 423; R. 264-70. 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Is the Agreement between the UGA, the City, and the Municipal 
Building Authority ultra vires and unenforceable because it purports to obligate the 
Municipal Building Authority to convey real property to a third party, which it has no 
authority to do under Utah's Municipal Building Authority Act? 
1
 The City and the Municipal Building Authority are referenced together as 
the "City" for all purposes except for their arguments under the Utah Municipal Building 
Authority Act. 
1 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's 
ruling on the issue. R. 424, 564 at 11-12. 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
3, Did the City breach the alleged Agreement with the UGA because 
the title to the property contained restrictions, but where the time for performance had not 
arrived, and the defects on the City's title were remediable? 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's 
ruling on this issue. R. 422, 424, 270-71. 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm yn v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
4. Should the district court have reconsidered its ruling that the City 
breached its Agreement with the UGA where, before discovery closed or the district court 
set a trial date on remaining issues, the City presented new, potentially dispositive legal 
arguments regarding the alleged breach and the enforceability of the Agreement and new 
material evidence regarding the alleged breach, and did the district court err in striking 
the new evidence? 
2 
This issue was raised in the district court, as evidenced in the district court's 
ruling on this issue. R. 421-425. 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
5. Did the district court err in calculating benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages by not deducting from the value of the property to be transferred to the UGA the 
price the UGA was to pay and the costs avoided by the UGA by not having to perform? 
This issue was raised at the bench trial on damages. R. 565 at 139-40. 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 902 (Utah 1999); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
6. If the City prevails on this appeal, should it be awarded attorney fees 
and costs incurred on this appeal and in the district court? 
Because the City did not prevail in the district court, this issue has not be 
raised directly. The district court did conclude that the Agreement between the parties 
did allow an award of attorney fees and costs to the UGA. R. 521, 549-50. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
determinative of issues in this appeal. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2(1): 
(1) A board of commissioners or city council may: 
(a) appropriate money for corporate purposes only; 
(b) provide for payment of debts and expenses of the 
corporation; 
(c) purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, and 
dispose of real and personal property for the benefit of the 
city, whether the property is within or without the city's 
corporate boundaries; and 
(d) improve, protect, and do any other thing in relation 
to this property than an individual would do. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903(l) and (2): 
(1) The governing body of a public body may organize 
a non-profit corporation as the building authority for the 
public body under this part, following the procedures set out 
in the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Cooperative 
Association Act (Title 16, Chapter 6, Article 2), solely for the 
purpose of accomplishing the public purposes for which the 
public body exists by acquiring, improving, or extending one 
or more projects and financing their costs on behalf of the 
public body. The authority shall be known as the "Municipal 
Building Authority of (name of public body)." The governing 
body shall approve the articles of incorporation and bylaws of 
the authority and shall act as the members of the board of 
trustees of the authority. The articles of incorporation and 
bylaws shall provide that members of the board of trustees of 
the authority may be removed and replaced by the governing 
authority any time in its discretion. The governing body may, 
at its sole discretion and at any time, alter or change the 
structure, organization, programs, or activities of the building 
authority, subject to the rights of holders of the authority's 
bonds and parties to its other obligations. 
(2) Each building authority is authorized to acquire, 
improve, or extend one or more projects and to finance their 
costs on behalf of the public body that created it, in 
4 
accordance with the procedures and subject to the limitations 
of this part, in order to accomplish the public purposes for 
which the public body exists. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case centers around an Agreement between the City of North Salt Lake 
(the "City") and the Utah Golf Association, Inc. (the "UGA"), in which the UGA agreed 
to lease office space in the clubhouse of the City's proposed new golf course. In an 
addendum to the Agreement, the Municipal Building Authority agreed to convey a certain 
piece of property (the "UGA Property") to the UGA for free if the UGA built its 
permanent headquarters on that property at the end of the original lease term. R. 27, 28 
ffif B, F, 4; R. 32, 34 ffl[ C, I, 6. If the UGA elected not to construct its facilities on the 
UGA Property, the UGA would instead get the proceeds of the sale of the UGA Property 
if it agreed to a new long-term (20-year) lease of the office space. R. 28 f^ 5(a); R. 34 f^ 
7(a). When the term of the original lease ended, the UGA did not construct its facilities 
on the UGA Property, and it did not agree to a new long-term lease of the office space. In 
December 1999, the City evicted the UGA. R. 162 Iflf 11-13. 
On January 21, 2000, the UGA filed a Complaint against the City, alleging 
breach of contract. The UGA alleged that a use restriction in the City's title to the UGA 
Property, and the City's failure to immediately remove this defect constituted a breach of 
the Agreement. R. 2-8 fflf 5-39. On May 4, 2000, the UGA filed a Motion for Partial 
5 
Summary Judgment on Liability, which the district court granted on July 14, 2000. 
R. 222-23. 
On January 17, 2001, the City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Reconsideration, arguing that the district court had failed to consider controlling Utah law 
in its ruling on liability. The City also presented new evidence that the use restriction on 
the deed could have been lifted. The district court concluded that these issues should 
have been raised previously, however, and denied the City's motion on May 15, 2001. 
R. 421-25. 
On May 30, 2001, the district court conducted a bench trial solely on the 
issue of damages, and on July 19, 2001, the court issued its Memorandum Decision. 
R. 440-47. The district court denied the UGA any damages related to its relocation, but 
concluded that the UGA was nevertheless "entitled to the value of what it bargained for," 
and awarded the UGA $158,441 in damages. R. 446. 
On October 10, 2001, the district court entered its Minute Entry Decision 
and Order, as well as its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 520-23; 525-29. 
Judgment was entered on November 13, 2001, R. 549-50, and on November 19, 2001, the 
City filed its Notice of Appeal. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Agreement. 
On March 31, 1992, the City and the UGA entered into an Agreement 
comprised of an "Office Use Agreement" ("Use Agreement") and a "First Addendum to 
the Office Use Agreement" ("First Addendum"). In this Agreement, the City agreed to 
construct, and the UGA agreed to lease for five years approximately 2,424 square feet of 
office space, which was to be located in the Clubhouse of the City's Eaglewood Golf 
Course. R. 11 f 2. The rent, or "user fee," for the office space was set at $30,300, R. 12 
Tf 4, which the UGA admitted was considerably below the market rate for comparable 
office space. R. 343 fflj 26-27 (stating that the UGA understood its user fee was at least 
$3.00 per square foot below the fair market rate for comparable office space); R. 8 f 38 
(stating that under another lease agreement with a different landlord, "the rent that will 
need to be paid will greatly exceed the rent that was charged under the Office Use 
Agreement with North Salt Lake"). 
To induce the UGA to enter into the Use Agreement, the First Addendum 
also included several "freebies," such as an additional 888 square feet of free space for 
the Utah Golf Hall of Fame, and the exclusive use of the golf course and golf carts for 
two days each year of the Agreement and the right to retain all green fees collected on 
those days. R. 27-28 fflj C, D, 2. The UGA also received exclusive access to the driving 
7 
range for two hours per week, and the right to retain all fees charged during that period. 
R. 27-28 TCI F, 3. 
The greatest inducement offered to the UGA, however, was the promise 
that the Municipal Building Authority would convey the UGA Property to the UGA for 
construction of its headquarters and a new Utah Golf Hall of Fame. R. 27-28 fflf B, F, 4. 
The Agreement stated: 
If at any time after the fourth Agreement Year of this 
Agreement User elects to construct its permanent 
headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA 
Property (collectively the "UGA Facility"), User shall deliver 
to Building Authority written notice thereof (the 
"Construction Notice"). The Construction Notice shall set 
forth the proposed occupancy date of the UGA Facility and 
shall be accompanied by a rendering and floor plan of the 
proposed UGA Facility. Upon review and approval of the 
final plans for the UGA Facility by the City of North Salt 
Lake and its staff, Building Authority shall cause the UGA 
Property to be conveyed, at no cost to User, by Special 
Warranty Deed to User. 
R. 28 H 4. 
The Agreement alternatively provided that if the UGA elected not to build 
on the UGA Property, the UGA could instead receive the proceeds from the sale of the 
property. The UGA was entitled to receive the sale proceeds, however, "only upon the 
following conditions: (a) User shall enter into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement 
for the Premises with a provision for an annual three percent (3%) increase in the base 
user fee for the extended term." R. 27, 28 ffif F, 5(a). The Agreement also provided a 
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right of first refusal on the UGA Property to the Municipal Building Authority, and 
reserved to the City the right to "approve the development and architectural plans of the 
third party buyer with respect to the UGA Property." R. 28-29 Ifij 5(b), 5(c). 
In January 1994, the City and the UGA amended their prior Agreement and 
executed a "Second Addendum to the Office Use Agreement" ("Second Addendum"). In 
the Second Addendum, the UGA agreed to lease approximately 2,178 square feet of 
office space rather than the 2,424 originally contemplated, R. 31 ^ B, and the user fee was 
changed to $25,000 to reflect the reduced square footage. R.32 j^ 1. The additional 888 
square feet of free space for the Golf Hall of Fame was also reduced to 710 square feet, 
R. 31 % E, and the UGA's right to retain the driving range fees collected during its 
exclusive two hours per week was reduced to half. R. 32 f H. All of the other "freebies" 
specified in the First Addendum were retained, however, including the provisions 
regarding the UGA Property, and the UGA also received an additional 125 square feet of 
free storage space and the right to retain half of the golf cart rental fees collected during 
its two days of exclusive access to the golf course. R. 32 fflf F, G. 
The most significant change in the Second Addendum was an amendment 
to the condition precedent regarding the UGA Property. As written in the Second 
Addendum, should the UGA elect not to build its headquarters and Utah Golf Hall of 
Fame on the UGA Property, it would be entitled to receive the proceeds of the sale of the 
UGA Property only if it first "enter[ed] into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement for 
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the Premises upon such terms and conditions agreed upon between the parties on or 
before the expiration of the original five (5) year Agreement Term." R. 34 f 7(a) 
(emphasis added). 
B. Negotiations on a New Lease. 
When the original lease term expired in January 1999, the UGA had not 
elected to build its permanent headquarters on the UGA Property, nor had it entered into a 
long-term lease with the City for the office space. R. 162 ^ 10-11. At that point, the 
City allowed the UGA to continue to rent office space in the clubhouse on a month-to-
month basis, while attempting to reach an agreement with the UGA for a new long-term 
lease. R. 162 f^ 12. Because the Agreement reserved a first right of refusal on the UGA 
Property to the Municipal Building Authority, which the Municipal Building Authority 
intended to exercise, the parties attempted to negotiate the value of the UGA Property 
directly into the terms of the new long-term lease agreement. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 
10 and 11, and Defendants' Trial Exhibit 18 (attached at the end of the Addendum). 
On December 7, 1999, after months of unsuccessful negotiation, and after 
nearly a year of a month-to-month tenancy, the City voted to end negotiations and evict 
the UGA. R. 564 at 21; see R. 150-151. The next day, the UGA sent a letter offering 
significantly higher lease terms than had previously been negotiated, which did not 
include the value of the UGA Property. R. 564 at 22; R. 148. Before receiving this 
December 8th letter, and without referencing it, the City terminated the month-to-month 
10 
lease with the UGA by proper written notice on December 9, 1999. R. 162 % 13; 
R. 150-53. 
C. Ruling on the UGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Liability 
In its ruling on the UGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Liability, the district court focused on the use restriction in the City's title to the UGA 
Property, which required that the property be used only for an addition to the City's golf 
course or as the UGA's headquarters. R. 222-223. Because the district court felt that this 
restriction would essentially prevent the property from being sold to anyone other than 
the City or the UGA, and the City was "unable to lift this restriction," it concluded that 
the City had anticipatorily breached the agreement with the UGA. R. 223. The court 
then explained that "an anticipatory breach will generally excuse the nonoccurrence of a 
condition precedent," and found that the UGA's failure to agree to a new long-term lease 
with the City was, therefore, excused. R. 223-24. 
The district court then considered whether the UGA had at least shown 
"readiness, willingness, and ability to have performed the conditions precedent." Because 
the UGA had clearly decided not to build on the UGA Property, the district court focused 
only on the condition precedent regarding the 20-year lease. The court concluded that the 
20-year lease provision in the Second Addendum was an unenforceable "agreement to 
agree," R. 224, so it turned instead to the 20-year lease provision in the First Addendum, 
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and found that the UGA's December 8, 1999 letter "evidences the plaintiffs readiness 
and willingness to enter into the required 20-year lease for more rent than required by the 
First Addendum." R. 224. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the UGA would 
have performed the condition precedent if the City had not first breached the Agreement, 
and granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
D. Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Reconsideration 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, which was filed 
before the end of discovery and before a trial date had been set, see R. 253-55, 389-90, 
the City argued that the district court had failed to consider controlling Utah law in its 
prior summary judgment ruling. Specifically, the City argued that the Agreement 
promising to convey the UGA Property was ultra vires and unenforceable because a 
municipality is prohibited from transferring public property for less than a present benefit 
that represents the fair market value of the property transferred. R. 264-67. At oral 
argument, the City also argued that the Agreement was ultra vires and unenforceable 
because it purported to obligate the Municipal Building Authority to convey the UGA 
Property to the UGA, and under Utah law a municipal building authority is not authorized 
to transfer public property to anyone other than the public body that created it. R. 564 
at 11-12. 
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The City also argued that in prematurely finding an anticipatory breach, the 
district court had failed to consider Utah law which clearly holds that a seller does not 
need to have unencumbered title to the property until the time for conveyance arrives, and 
any title defects discovered prior to that time will not constitute a breach unless they are 
irremediable. R. 270-71. Relative to this issue, the City presented the affidavit of Mary 
Wood Cannon, which stated that the developer was then, and was before, willing to 
release the deed restriction if the City would have agreed to exercise its right of first 
refusal on the property. R. 320-22. The UGA moved to strike the affidavit because Ms. 
Cannon had not been identified by the City as a final witness and because this issue 
should have been raised previously. R. 342. The UGA also argued that Ms. Cannon's 
testimony was irrelevant to any material issue. R. 343. The district court agreed and 
granted the UGA's Motion to Strike. R. 422. 
The district court also denied the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Reconsideration, ruling that because the City had "ample opportunity" to respond to the 
UGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability, it should not now be heard to 
raise any new arguments. R. 423-24 . The court wrote, "To the extent that a Motion for 
Reconsideration exists at all, it does not exist for the purpose of raising new legal 
arguments that were not raised in an original Motion." R. 424. The district court also 
stated that even if it were appropriate to reconsider its grant of partial summary judgment, 
it would not be persuaded by the City's new substantive arguments. R. 424. 
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£. Ruling on Damages 
In its July 19, 2001 Memorandum Decision following the bench trial on 
damages, the district court found that the Agreement included the implied promise that at 
the end of the original five-year lease term, the UGA would "negotiate in good faith for a 
more lengthy 20 year lease." R. 441. The court then reiterated that because "[t]he 
problems with the deed restrictions on the lot could not be resolved," the UGA "refused 
to enter into a long-term lease." R. 442. 
Because the UGA could easily have agreed to a 20-year lease, however, and 
resolved the issue of the UGA Property later, the district court denied the UGA any 
consequential damages related to relocation following the Notice to Quit. R. 443-45. 
The district court also determined that the UGA was "entitled to the value of what it 
bargained for, that is, a lot that could be sold for its highest and best use," and therefore 
awarded the UGA $158,441 for the value of the UGA Property (18,975 square feet at 
$8.35 per square foot). R. 446. The court also awarded prejudgment interest as of the 
effective date of the Notice to Quit, which was January 1, 2000. R. 446. 
In the October 10, 2001 Minute Entry Decision and Order, the district court 
ruled the UGA was entitled to attorney fees and costs for all matters relating to the issue 
of liability as determined in the first summary judgment, fees in responding to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, and fees for preparation for trial, trial time, 
and post-trial time related to the value of the property. R. 521. 
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In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court found that 
"North Salt Lake did not hold title to the subject lot that would make it marketable to 
third parties because of use restrictions in the deed," R. 527 ^ 12, and that the City "did 
not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot." R. 528 Tf 14. The court also found 
that the "UGA required North Salt Lake to be able to convey the lot free and clear from 
the use restrictions before entering into a new lease," R. 528 ^ 16, and that "[b]ut for the 
use restrictions on the lot, the parties would have successfully negotiated a 20-year lease." 
R. 528 % 17. Based on these facts, the district court concluded that the City had 
"breached the lease by not being able to convey unrestricted, fee title to the lot that could 
be marketed to third parties." R. 529 If 1. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Based on well-established Utah law, it is clear that the district court erred in 
finding the City liable for breach of contract and in awarding damages to the UGA. First, 
in granting partial summary judgment to the UGA, the district court ignored the settled 
rule that a vendor of real property is generally not required to have clear and marketable 
title until the time for conveyance arrives, and that if the time for conveyance has not yet 
arrived, any defect in the title is irrelevant and does not constitute a breach unless it is 
irremediable. 
Here, the time for conveyance had not arrived because the UGA had yet to 
satisfy any of the conditions precedent outlined in the Agreement, and the district court 
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made no finding that the defect on the title was irremediable. Instead, it simply found that 
the use restriction had not been removed. By mistakenly focusing on whether the defect 
had been cured, rather than whether the defect could be cured, the district court 
prematurely and incorrectly concluded that the City had anticipatorily breached the 
Agreement. 
The district court also incorrectly construed the 20-year lease provision in 
the Second Addendum as an unenforceable "agreement to agree" when it was actually a 
valid condition precedent. Yet, even if the 20-year lease provision of the Second 
Addendum could be ignored in favor of the 20-year lease provision of the First 
Addendum, the UGA did not strictly comply with the terms of the First Addendum, 
meaning that its rights to the proceeds from the sale of the UGA Property never matured. 
Second, and even more important, the district court erred when it denied the 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration. This motion was based on 
controlling Utah law that goes to the very heart of the Agreement's enforceability. Utah 
law prohibits a municipality from disposing of public property by gift without specific 
legislative authority. To avoid being an illegal gift, transfers of public property must be 
for adequate consideration, which this Court has defined as a present benefit that reflects 
the fair market value of the property transferred. Here, the Agreement neither recited nor 
provided consideration for the UGA Property, let alone consideration reflecting the fair 
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market value of the property, and as a result, the proposed transfer was nothing more than 
an illegal gift. Thus, the Agreement is ultra vires and unenforceable. 
The Agreement is also ultra vires and unenforceable because Utah law does 
not authorize municipal building authorities to transfer public property to anyone other 
than the public body that created them. Here, because the Agreement identifies the 
Municipal Building Authority as the title owner of the UGA Property and purports to 
obligate it, according to the UGA, to convey that property to the UGA, the Agreement is 
ultra vires and unenforceable. 
These legal arguments, along with the new evidence that the use restriction 
on the deed could have actually been removed, presented the matter in a new light, and a 
manifest injustice resulted when the district court refused to reconsider its prior ruling. 
The City asked for reconsideration before the end of discovery and before a trial date had 
been set. When the district court refused to consider this controlling Utah law and instead 
awarded damages to the UGA, it improperly gave effect to an unenforceable agreement. 
Finally, at the very least, the district court erred in awarding the UGA 
damages reflecting the full value of the UGA Property, without subtracting the costs the 
UGA would have incurred had the Agreement not been breached—the payments that 
would have been made under a new long-term lease. The damages award is, therefore, 
contrary to the benefit-of-the-bargain damages measure, and is disproportionately harsh 
and unreasonable. For all of these reasons, the decision of the district court should be 
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reversed. The City should also be awarded attorney fees and costs on this appeal and in 
the district court if it prevails. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE UGA IS 
ULTRA VIRES AND NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
A. The Agreement Lacks The Required Consideration And Is 
Therefore Not Enforceable 
1. Actions to Give Awav Public Property are Ultra Vires in 
Utah. 
This Court has long held that because a municipality holds its property "in 
trust for the use and benefit of its inhabitants/' municipal property "cannot be disposed of 
by gift without specific legislative authority." Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119 
(Utah 1975). To avoid being an illegal gift, a transfer of municipal property must be 
made "in good faith and for an adequate consideration." Id. "Adequate consideration" 
must be "present benefit that reflects the fair market value" of the property transferred, 
and as such, the consideration cannot be speculative nor provide a future benefit. 
Municipal Bldg. Autk v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1985). The Court must be 
able to specify "exactly what [the] benefit is, in present market value terms," and a 
"general finding" of some benefit is not sufficient. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 985 P.2d 899, 910 (Utah 1999). 
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In Sears, Ogden City wanted to vacate a street that divided the Ogden High 
School campus and give the land to the Board of Education of Ogden City. Despite the 
intended public purpose of the transfer, this Court held that the proposed conveyance was 
improper because Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2, which allows a city to "dispose" of its 
property, does not allow disposal by gift but only for "adequate consideration." Sears, 
533 P.2d at 119. The substance of that statute has not changed since Sears was decided. 
In Lowder, Iron County wanted to transfer an old jail and site to its own 
county municipal building authority for a nominal sum. Even though the agreement 
resulted in a new jail for the county and provided that the property would revert to the 
county in 20 years, and even though the agreement was between the county and its own 
municipal building authority, this Court disallowed the transfer because the county would 
not receive "present benefit that reflects the fair market value" of the property transferred. 
Lowder, 111 P.2d at 282. This Court concluded that the benefit Iron County received 
under its agreement was "a speculative and future benefit that cannot suffice to validate a 
present transfer of the fee." Id. 
In Salt Lake County Comm % this Court ruled that contributions to certain 
charities by Salt Lake County were illegal because the contributions "were not tied to any 
specific services to be rendered," and the county failed to provide a "detailed showing of 
the benefits to be obtained from the money given." Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 985 P.2d 
at 910. 
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It is critical that the Court see from these cases that the kind of 
consideration required for the transfer of public property is not the typical "bargained for 
exchange" that is required in contracts generally. Cf Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 71 and comment c (stating that consideration can be a mixture of bargain and gift, and 
courts generally will not scrutinize the gift part). Unlike consideration in general, the 
consideration this Court has required for the transfer of public property must be real and 
substantial; it must be nothing less than a "present benefit that reflects fair market value." 
Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. There is no such consideration here. 
2. The Agreement of the Parties Provided No Consideration for 
the Conveyance of the UGA Property. 
a. The express terms of the Agreement do not provide 
any consideration for the transfer of the UGA Property. 
Neither the First Addendum nor Second Addendum recites any 
consideration for the UGA Property. Instead, both simply state that if the UGA elects to 
build its headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property, the 
"Building Authority shall cause the UGA Property to be conveyed, at no cost to User, by 
Special Warranty deed to User." R. 27 J^ 4 (emphasis added); R. 32 % 6 (emphasis added). 
Should the UGA elect not to construct its new facilities on the UGA property, the UGA 
was entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the UGA Property, as long as it first entered 
into a "long-term (twenty years) use agreement for the Premises" with the City. R. 28 
Tf 5(a); R. 34 ^ 7(a). In reality, the promise to convey the UGA Property was offered 
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simply "[a]s a further inducement for User (UGA) to enter into a use agreement" with the 
City, but the UGA did not promise to give present benefit that reflected fair market value 
of the property. R.271JF; R.32^I . 
This is not consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt 
Lake County Comm 'n. Therefore, the Agreement is outside the scope of the City's 
powers, and it is ultra vires and unenforceable. See McQuillan, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 29.91 (3d ed. 1999) ("To be valid and enforceable,... the contract must 
be within the scope of the municipal powers, i.e., it must not be ultra vires . . . . " ) ; John 
W. Smith, The Modern Municipal Law of Corporations § 628 (1903) ("Acts of municipal 
corporations which are done without power expressly granted, or fairly to be implied 
from the powers granted or incident to the purposes of their creation, are ultra vires."). 
b. The rental paid by the UGA for the office space was 
not consideration for the UGA Property. 
The fact that the UGA accepted the inducement, entered into the Use 
Agreement with the City, and paid rent for the office space for six years does not make 
that part of the Agreement dealing with the UGA Property valid because the payments 
made by the UGA represented the lease value of the office space and bore no relationship 
to the value of the UGA Property. Indeed, the UGA's payments under the Agreement do 
not even represent the fair market value of the office space leased. 
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Under the Second Addendum, the UGA leased the office space for $25,000 
per year, for six years (the five-year original term, plus one year of month-to-month 
tenancy), for about $150,000 total in user fees. The UGA admitted that this amount was 
below the fair market rate for the lease of comparable office space. R. 343 fflf 26-27 
(stating that the UGA understood its user fee was at least $3.00 per square foot below the 
fair market rate for comparable office space); R. 8 ^ f 38 (stating that under another lease 
agreement with a different landlord, "the rent that will need to be paid will greatly exceed 
the rent that was charged under the Office Use Agreement with North Salt Lake"). 
The UGA also received from the City, however, $33,192 in green fees and 
golf cart rentals over the life of the Use Agreement. R. 313. This means that the UGA 
actually paid only about $117,000 for office space worth more than $150,000. (The total 
amount paid by the UGA is also well below the fair market value of the UGA property, 
which the UGA estimated at $ 190,000, R. 262-63 % 25; R. 310-311; and the district court 
valued at $158, 441. R. 446.) Because the payments made by the UGA under the Use 
Agreement did not even cover the value of the office space, they cannot be construed as 
the consideration for the UGA Property of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt 
Lake County Comm yn. 
22 
c. The 20-year lease condition precedent also could not 
be consideration for the transfer of the UGA Property. 
The 20-year lease condition precedent to obtaining the proceeds from the 
UGA Property also would not have been a "present benefit that reflects the fair market 
value" of the UGA Property and, therefore, is not consideration for the transfer of the 
UGA Property. As with the original Use Agreement, any payments the UGA would have 
made under a 20-year lease would have represented the value of the office space in the 
clubhouse over 20 years and would not have included the value of the UGA Property. 
The district court implicitly confirmed this when, while awarding damages 
to the UGA for its lost benefit of the bargain, the court did not deduct the amount of lease 
payments the UGA would have made under a 20-year lease from the value of the UGA 
Property. R. 446. An essential step in calculating benefit-of-the-bargain damages is to 
deduct from the value the non-breaching party would have received from performance of 
the contract the costs that party would have incurred in performing the contract. See 
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 150-151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Restatement (Second) 
of Contract § 347 (expectation interest damages must be reduced by "any cost or other 
loss . . . avoided by not having to perform"). In fact, the district court deducted nothing 
from what it found to be the value of the UGA Property, R. 446, thereby recognizing the 
Agreement provided no consideration for the proceeds of the sale of that property.2 
2
 The City also presented undisputed evidence that payments made under a 
20-year lease would not have included any value in addition to just paying for the office 
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By all appearances, the UGA property was just a gift thrown into the 
Agreement—like the free Hall of Fame space and green fees—to induce the UGA to 
maintain its offices at the clubhouse. Because the City is prohibited under Utah law from 
giving away its property for less than a "present benefit that reflects fair market value," 
and because the Agreement lacks this required consideration, the Agreement regarding 
the UGA Property is ultra vires and cannot be enforced. See Emmett Clinton Yokley, 
Municipal Corporations § 438 (1958) (stating that "an ultra vires contract is no contract at 
all"). As a result, the UGA is not entitled to the benefit of this unenforceable bargain. 
The ruling of the district court should be reversed. 
space. If the First Addendum provision were used, as the district court ruled, R.224, the 
user fee for the 20-year use agreement would have been three percent above the $25,000 
base fee paid under the Second Addendum, or $25,750 for the first year, with the amount 
going up three percent annually. R. 28. Assuming the 20-year use agreement had been 
executed at $25,750 per year for 2,178 square feet, that would be $11.82 per square feet. 
When the free Utah Golf Hall of Fame space is factored in along with an average of 
$5,532 per year in green fees and golf cart rentals the UGA received over the course of 
the Use Agreement, the effective rental rate would have been a mere $7.01 per square 
foot for the first year. R. 313. Since the UGA vacated the clubhouse at the end of 1999, 
the City has leased approximately 1,450 square feet of the space originally occupied by 
the UGA for an average of $12.17 per square foot, and these renters are not allowed 
exclusive use of the golf course or the retention of any green fees or golf cart rentals. 
R. 330; R. 343 \ 26 (stating that the UGA believes $14.50 per square foot is the fair 
market rate of the office space). Thus, it is obvious that the amount the UGA would have 
paid under a 20-year use agreement would have been well below fair market value; 
therefore, the 20-year lease could not have been consideration for the transfer of the UGA 
property. 
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B, The Agreement Is Also Ultra Vires and Unenforceable Because 
the Municipal Building Authority Has No Authority to Convey 
Title to the UGA. 
The Agreement is also ultra vires and unenforceable because the Municipal 
Building Authority has no authority to convey title of the UGA property to the UGA. 
Under Utah's Municipal Building Authority Act, municipal building authorities may be 
organized "solely for the purpose of accomplishing the public purposes for which the 
public body exists by acquiring, improving, or extending one or more projects and 
financing their costs on behalf of the public body." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903(l). 
Municipal building authorities are therefore authorized to "acquire, improve, or extend 
one or more projects and to finance their costs on behalf of the public body that created 
[them]." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903(2). They are not empowered under the Act, 
however, to dispose of property to anyone other than the public body that created them. 
Despite the clear limitations placed on municipal building authorities under 
the Act, the Agreement recites that the "Building Authority is the fee title owner of a 
certain parcel of real property (4the UGA Property')," and that "[a]s a further inducement 
for User to enter into a use agreement, Building Authority agrees to convey to User the 
UGA Property." R. 27 ffif B, F (emphasis added); R. 32 fflf C, I (emphasis added). 
Because the Agreement here purports to obligate the Municipal Building Authority to do 
something which it has no authority to do—to convey the property to the UGA—the 
Agreement is ultra vires on its face and is therefore unenforceable. See McQuillan, The 
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Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.91 (3d ed. 1999); John W. Smith, The Modern 
Municipal Law of Corporations § 628 (1903); see also Emmett Clinton Yokley, 
Municipal Corporations § 438 (1958) (stating that "an ultra vires contract is no contract at 
all"). Without an enforceable agreement, the City can have no liability, and the UGA can 
recover no damages. The ruling of the district court should be reversed. 
C. The UGA Is Bound By the City's Lack Of Authority To Enter 
Into the Agreement And Is Chargeable With Knowledge Of 
These Limitations. 
The district court's conclusion that the UGA was entitled to its expectation 
interest, or the foil value of the UGA Property, is directly contrary to the rule that 
[t]he municipal corporation cannot in any manner bind itself 
by any contract which is beyond the scope of its powers, or 
foreign to the purposes for which it was created, or which is 
forbidden by law, or against public policy; all persons 
contracting with the corporation are deemed to know its 
limitations in these respects. 
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999). 
If the City cannot be bound by an ultra vires agreement that is beyond the 
scope of its powers, the UGA cannot be entitled to any damages based on that agreement. 
The Agreement here was ultra vires in at least two respects, as discussed above, and by 
awarding damages to the UGA reflecting the value of the UGA Property, the district court 
actually gave effect to an unenforceable Agreement and improperly accomplished "by 
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indirection that which [the] municipality is not permitted to do directly." McQuillan, The 
Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.111.10 (3d ed. 1999). 
In oral arguments on this issue, the district court expressed concern about 
the fairness of leaving the UGA without a remedy for the City's alleged breach. The 
court asked, "So if you deal with some governmental agency that claims to have authority 
and agrees to do things that it cannot legally do, you do so at your own risk?" R. 564 
at 12. When counsel responded, "I think to some extent you do, your Honor," the Court 
remarked, "Why does that strike me as inordinately unfair?" R. 564 at 12. 
The district court's concerns, though understandable, were misplaced 
because "[t]he general rule is well settled and enforced that one who makes a contract 
with a municipal corporation is bound to take notice of limitations on its power to 
contract and also of the power of the particular officer or agency to make the contract." 
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999); id. § 39.37 ("One 
who deals with a municipality is bound by the limitations on its powers, and is chargeable 
with knowledge of these limitations."); see Emmett Clinton Yokley, Municipal 
Corporations § 436 (1958); John W. Smith, The Modern Municipal Law of Corporations 
§§662,664(1903). 
This Court has accepted and applied this general rule. See, e.g. Municipal 
Building Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 279 (Utah 1985) (citing McQuillan, The Law of 
Municipal Corporations § 29.04); Thatcher Chemical Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 21 
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Utah 2d 355, 358, 445 P.2d 769, 771 (Utah 1968) (citing McQuillan, The Law of 
Municipal Corporations § 29.28). This Court has gone so far as to say that "[o]ne who 
deals with a municipal corporation does so at his peril." Thatcher Chemical Co., 21 Utah 
2d at 358, 445 P.2d at 771; see also McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§ 29.04 (3d ed. 1999) ("When a municipality goes beyond the law, the person who deals 
with it in so doing does so at his or her own risk."). 
Here, the UGA knowingly negotiated a very favorable deal with the City 
containing several "freebies," and under Utah law, it is charged with the knowledge that 
the Agreement was outside the authority granted to the City. Although the district court 
may have thought this result unfair and believed it could provide a remedy, the law is 
clear as to who bears the burden when a municipality makes an ultra vires agreement. 
Moreover, "[a] contrary doctrine would be fraught with danger. It is better that the 
innocent contracting party suffer from the municipality's mistakes than to adopt rules, 
which, through improper combination or collusion, could be detrimental or injurious to 
the public." McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999). 
While the law is that the UGA had to deal with the City at its own risk, the 
City notes that if the Court agrees and invalidates that portion of the Agreement regarding 
the UGA Property, the UGA is not harmed in the least. As discussed above, the UGA 
paid approximately $117,000 over six years for office space that was worth more than 
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$150,000. Thus, the UGA got exactly what it paid for and more. It just also wants to 
reap the windfall benefits of an illegal agreement. 
Both public policy and Utah law require that the UGA bears the risk of 
making an ultra vires agreement with the City. As a result, the City cannot be bound by 
the Agreement and the UGA is not entitled to any damages that would in effect enforce 
an unenforceable agreement. 
II. EVEN IF THE AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE, THE CITY 
DID NOT BREACH ANY PROVISIONS. 
A. The City Did Not Actually or Anticipatorily Breach The 
Agreement Because Any Defects on the Title of the UGA 
Property Were Irrelevant. 
Although the district court concluded that the City breached the Agreement 
by not holding clear and marketable title to the UGA Property, R. 222-23, this conclusion 
is wrong. Under the clear terms of the Agreement, the UGA was entitled to conveyance 
of the title to the UGA Property only if it first elected to construct its headquarters and the 
Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the property and had its plans approved by the City. R. 34 
U 6. Because the UGA had decided not to build on the UGA property, it was instead 
entitled only to the proceeds from the sale of the property (and then only if it first agreed 
to a 20-year lease). R. 34 ^ 7(a). Thus, any defects on the title of the UGA Property were 
irrelevant. 
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This is especially true because the Municipal Building Authority, the entity 
that according to the Agreement held title to the UGA Property, had a right of first refusal 
on any sale of the UGA Property, and it planned to exercise that right. As a result, 
because a third party would not end up with the property, the parties attempted to 
negotiate the value of the UGA Property into the terms of the 20-year lease agreement.3 
See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 10 and 11 and Defendants' Trial Exhibit 18 (attached at end 
of Addendum). Because the UGA was only entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the 
UGA Property and the Municipal Building Authority planned to keep the property, either 
the value could have been taken into account in the 20-year lease or, as the district court 
found when calculating damages, the UGA could have signed a 20-year lease and gone to 
court over the value of the UGA Property. R. 443-44. The bottom line, however, is that 
the defects on the title were irrelevant. 
3
 Such an agreement would have avoided the practical limitations of the 
Municipal Building Authority's powers, as well as made the defect on the title irrelevant, 
while at the same time providing the UGA with all it was entitled to under the 
Agreement. The value of the property was determined by an appraiser prior to the 
commencement of negotiations, and could have been factored into the parties' dealings if 
the UGA would have negotiated in good faith. (The appraisal, dated September 3, 1998, 
was admitted as Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 16, but it is not reproduced in the Addendum 
because of its size.) Moreover, because the City planned to use the property for golf 
course purposes, which was allowed by the use restriction, the defects on the title were 
further irrelevant. 
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B. The City Also Did Not Actually or Anticipatorily Breach the 
Agreement Because Its Performance was Not Yet Due and Any 
Defects On the Title Were Not Irremediable. 
When the district court concluded that the City had anticipatorily breached 
the Agreement by not holding clear and marketable title, the court missed the point that 
the UGA was only entitled to proceeds, not title. Yet, assuming the UGA was entitled to 
title, the district court also failed to consider the well-established rule that a seller is 
allowed reasonable time to perfect title. See Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 
716, 724 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Callister v. Millstream Assocs. Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 
664 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Generally, this means that a seller is not required to have 
full and clear marketable title until the time for conveyance has arrived. Corporation 
Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 53, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1973); Marlowe Inv. Corp. v. 
Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 126, 485 P.2d 1402, 1404 (Utah 1971); Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 
Utah 2d 220, 222, 357 P.2d 190, 192-93 (Utah 1960); Owens v. Neymeyer, 62 Utah 80, 
221 P. 160, 162-163 (1923). In fact, a seller can make a valid contract to sell real property 
to which he has no legal title at all, as long as the seller has title when the time comes to 
convey. Neves v. Wright, 638P.2d 1195, 1197, 1199 n.l (Utah \9U)\ see Foxley v. Rich, 
99 P. 666, 669-70 (Utah 1909) (stating that the seller can even transfer title to a third 
party during the executory period of the contract). 
If the time for conveyance has not yet arrived, any defect in the title is 
irrelevant and does not constitute a breach unless it plainly appears that the seller has lost 
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or so encumbered the title that he will be unable to perform when the time arrives. 
Marlowe Inv. Corp., 26 Utah 2d at 127, 485 P.2d at 1404. The test is whether the defect 
in the title by its nature is one that can, as a practical matter, be removed. Neves, 628 
P.2d at 1199. The buyer should not be heard to complain unless it appears that it will be 
impossible for the seller to perform his duties under the contract when he is called upon to 
do so. Corporation Nine, 30 Utah 2d at 53-54, 513 P.2d at 421. 
This rule is meant to provide the necessary flexibility in real estate 
transactions, Neves, 638 P.2d at 1198, but here the district court took away all flexibility 
by prematurely and improperly finding an anticipatory repudiation. 
Under well-established principles of contract interpretation, 
where the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon 
the occurrence or existence of a condition precedent, the 
obligee may not require performance by the obligor, because 
the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right to 
demand performance, does not arise until that condition 
occurs or exists. 
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999) (citing 3A 
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 628, at 16 (I960)); Commercial Union Assocs. v. 
Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation omitted) (stating that "[a] 
condition precedent is one which must be performed by the one party to an existing 
contract before the other party is obligated" and "[c]ourts must respect express conditions 
precedent"). 
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Here, the time for conveyance had not yet arrived because neither of the 
conditions precedent had been satisfied. The UGA had elected not to build its 
headquarters and Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property, and it had failed to agree 
to continue leasing the office space under a new 20-year lease with the City. As a result, 
the City was under no obligation to perfect the title or otherwise perform under the 
Agreement, and the UGA had no right to demand such performance. See Harper, 976 
P.2d at 1217 (citing 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 630) ("Failure of a 
material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform."). Any defect 
on the title was, therefore, irrelevant and could not possibly constitute a breach of the 
Agreement. 
There also was no anticipatory breach of the Agreement because the district 
court made no finding that the City's ultimate performance was impossible or even 
improbable. The district court simply found that the City did not—not could not—perfect 
the title. R. 222-23; R. 528 f^ 14. But since the time to convey had not arrived, whether 
the City had in fact perfected the title was irrelevant. The only issue properly before the 
district court was whether the City could ultimately perfect the title when the time for 
conveyance arrived. 
In fact, the use restriction complained of by the UGA could have been 
removed by the City when the time came for conveyance. R. 321 Tf 6. When the City 
presented an affidavit to this effect on its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
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Reconsideration, however, the district court granted the UGA's Motion to Strike and 
refused to consider this crucial and material evidence.4 R. 321 j^ 6; R. 422. 
In the end, the key issue in determining whether there has been an 
anticipatory breach of a real estate agreement is whether it is beyond the power of the 
seller to comply with the terms of his own contract. Foxley v. Rich, 99 P. 666, 669-70 
(Utah 1909). Here, the City had the power to comply with the terms of its Agreement 
with UGA, and it would have fully performed when the time for performance arrived. 
The City was never given that chance. The ruling of the district court, therefore, should 
be reversed. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING THAT THE CONDITION 
PRECEDENT IN THE SECOND ADDENDUM WAS AN 
UNENFORCEABLE "AGREEMENT TO AGREE" WAS 
UNNECESSARY AND WRONG. 
Because the district court improperly concluded that the City had 
anticipatorily breached the Agreement by not immediately perfecting the title to the UGA 
Property, it excused the UGA's actual performance of any of the condition precedents. 
4
 As with the legal arguments presented in the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Reconsideration, this new evidence was improperly excluded by the district 
court. See infra Part V. When a party offers new evidence, in particular new evidence 
that goes to a material issue or presents the matter in a "different light" or under "different 
circumstances," a motion to reconsider should be granted. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, despite the UGA's bald 
assertion that the affidavit was immaterial, the fact that the use restriction could have 
been removed, and that the City could have in fact perfected title when the time for 
performance arrived, went to a material issue at the very heart of the case. This evidence 
should have been considered by the district court. 
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The district court looked next to whether the UGA had at least been "ready and willing" 
to perform a condition precedent. Because the UGA had clearly elected not to build its 
headquarters or the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property, the district court 
considered only the issue of whether the UGA would have entered into a 20-year lease 
agreement with the City. R. 224. 
At that point, the district court concluded that it could not determine 
whether the UGA had been ready and willing to perform this condition precedent 
contained in the Second Addendum, which required a 20-year lease upon such terms and 
conditions as agreed upon by the parties, because it found that this provision was an 
unenforceable "agreement to agree." The district court then turned to the First 
Addendum and found that the UGA's December 8, 1999 letter showed that it had been 
ready and willing to perform under those terms.5 R. 224. 
The district court's legal conclusion that the condition precedent in the 
Second Addendum was an unenforceable '"agreement to agree" is wrong. Although Utah 
law does hold that indefinite options to renew in lease agreements are not enforceable, see 
5
 Such legal gymnastics were wholly unnecessary, however, and resulted 
from the district court putting the proverbial cart before the horse. As discussed at length 
above, had the district court properly considered and applied Utah law regarding title 
defects and when they need to be cleared, it would have been required to simply ask 
whether the condition precedent had been satisfied to determine whether the time for 
performance had arisen, which it had not. By finding that the very thing that would have 
triggered performance and the need to have clear and marketable title—the condition 
precedent—was excused because the City did not have clear and marketable title was 
backward reasoning. 
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Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988); Brown's Shoe Fit v. Olch, 
955 P.2d 357, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), it was wrong for the district court to construe the 
20-year lease provision in the Second Addendum as a covenant promising an option to 
renew. Instead, this provision was a condition precedent in an agreement to convey real 
property, and conditions precedent are entirely different from covenants. While 
covenants determine what must be performed to discharge duties, conditions simply 
determine when and if the duties defined in the covenants must be performed. In other 
words, "[a] condition precedent is a fact or event which the parties intend must exist or 
take place before there is a right to performance.... A condition is distinguished from a 
promise in that it creates no right or duty in and of itself but is merely a limiting or 
modifying factor.. . ." Lack v. Cahill, 85 A.2d 481 (Conn. 1951). 
Because of their unique nature, conditions precedent are not required to be 
explicitly based on wholly objective criteria or be enforceable agreements in their own 
right. In fact, a condition precedent may be based solely on one's own personal 
satisfaction with the quality of the performance for which he has bargained. 3 A Arthur L. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 644 at 78-79 (1960). Courts around the country have 
upheld conditions precedent based on personal satisfaction, even in cases involving the 
sale of real property. See, e.g. Mattel v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958) (where 
plaintiff real estate developer contracted to buy real property for a shopping center subject 
to defendant obtaining leases satisfactory to the purchaser); Western Hills, Oregon, Ltd. v. 
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Pfau, 508 P.2d 201 (Or. 1973) (where purchaser of real property was to obtain necessary 
permits for a development satisfactory to the parties); Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle First 
Nat'I Bank, 645 P.2d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (where plaintiff purchaser contracted for 
purchase of real estate, subject to purchaser's receipt of satisfactory feasibility report). 
Public policy further supports the view that the 20-year lease provision in 
the Second Addendum was a valid condition precedent and was not an unenforceable 
"agreement to agree." Courts refuse to enforce covenants with indefinite options to 
renew because courts are not equipped to make monetary decisions impacted by the 
fluctuating commercial world and are even less prepared to impose paternalistic 
agreements on litigants. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1989). 
Because this was simply a condition precedent, however, none of these concerns is at 
issue. Here, the district court was not required to specifically enforce the Agreement or 
otherwise fashion a lease agreement for the parties. Instead, the district court simply 
needed to look to see if an extended lease agreement had been made (on any terms) and if 
the condition precedent had thus been satisfied.6 
6
 Even if the condition precedent here is treated as a straight lease option, a 
minority line of cases would still uphold the language in the Second Addendum. Under 
this rule, a lease option with undetermined terms is nevertheless enforceable because the 
court implies a mutual agreement for a reasonable rental which prevents the promise from 
being illusory. See Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 
(Utah 1976) (discussing the minority line of cases). Here, the district court found an 
implied covenant to negotiate in good faith, R. 441, which would make the option 
enforceable under this analysis. 
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Fairness also supports the conclusion that the condition in the Second 
Addendum in this case is valid. If the district court's award of damages is affirmed, the 
UGA will have paid the City $117,000 for six years' use of office space valued at over 
$150,000, but the City will be required to pay the UGA over $158,000 in damages, 
meaning the UGA made money on the deal. Had the 20-year lease agreement been 
enforced as a condition precedent to the City's obligations regarding the UGA Property, 
at least the UGA would have been paying the City over $25,000 per year for 20 years. 
In sum, the condition precedent contained in the Second Addendum was 
valid and was not satisfied. Therefore, the City's duty regarding the UGA Property under 
the Agreement never arose, and the UGA is not entitled to any damages. The ruling of 
the district court should be reversed. 
IV. EVEN WERE THE CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE SECOND 
ADDENDUM NOT VALID, THE UGA ALSO FAILED TO SATISFY 
THE CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE FIRST ADDENDUM. 
Even were the condition precedent in the Second Addendum not valid, the 
UGA is still not entitled to any damages because it never satisfied the condition precedent 
outlined in the First Addendum. The First Addendum required that before the expiration 
of the original lease term, the UGA must agree to a 20-year lease extension with a three 
percent annual increase from the base fee. R. 28 ^ 5(a). But, the UGA did not make an 
offer meeting these terms until December 8, 1999, almost a full year after the original 
term of the lease had expired, and the day after the City had voted to discontinue 
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negotiations and prepare an eviction notice. R. 148; R. 150-51. The UGA was clearly 
not "ready and willing" to perform under the terms of the First Addendum at the end of 
the original lease term, and it is not entitled to any damages. At the very least, an issue of 
fact exists on this point that would preclude summary judgment. 
If this provision from the First Addendum is considered to be an option to 
extend as the district court apparently believed it was, given its ruling on the Second 
Addendum, Utah law is clear that option provisions must be strictly complied with and 
that notice of an intent to extend must be given before the end of the original lease term. 
Professors Thomas and Backman have summarized Utah law on this issue as follows: 
An option to renew or extend a lease must be 
exercised before the expiration of the lease unless otherwise 
provided. If the lease does not specify how the option is to be 
exercised, it must be done in a manner that indicates to the 
lessor an unconditional and unqualified determination to 
exercise the option. 
D. Thomas & J. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law, § 5.01(f) 
at 188 (Lexis 1999) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). This Court has also written that 
"[w]hen the optionee decides to exercise his option he must act unconditionally and 
precisely according to the terms of the option." Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble 
Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1984) (quoting Williston on Contracts § 61D (3d 
ed. 1957)) (emphasis added). Clearly, if the provision of the First Addendum was an 
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option, the December 8, 1999 letter did not properly evidence a willingness to exercise 
the option and the district court should be reversed on this point. 
V. NORTH SALT LAKE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
Although not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
motion to reconsider summary judgment is permitted where the summary judgment is 
subject to revision (i.e., where summary judgment did not dispose of the whole case and a 
final judgment has not been entered). Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 
1993) ("because the summary judgment was 'subject to revision,' a motion to reconsider 
is a reasonable means of requesting such a revision and is therefore permitted."). Here, 
the partial summary judgment ruling on liability did not dispose of the whole case, and 
the City properly filed a motion to reconsider presenting new material facts and new legal 
theories that had not already been considered. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration was filed before the end of discovery and 
before the district court had set a trial date. R. 253-55, 389-90. 
A court can consider several factors in determining the 
propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include, 
but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is presented in a 
"different light" or under "different circumstances;" (2) there 
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new 
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does 
not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its 
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own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when 
first contemplated by the court. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P,2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Here, the issue of the basic enforceability of the Agreement, and thus the 
UGA's right to damages, was presented in a new and different light in the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration. The district court had never heard or 
considered any arguments regarding the City's lack of authority to dispose of public 
property by gift or the Municipal Building Authority's lack of authority to convey 
property to anyone other than the public body that created it, and the motion to reconsider 
presented these new legal theories to the court in a timely way before a trial date had been 
set. This controlling Utah law would have materially affected the outcome of the 
litigation and should have been considered by the district court. 
The district court also failed to consider controlling Utah law regarding 
when a seller is required to have clear and marketable title, and as a result, it improperly 
found that the City had anticipatorily breached its Agreement with the UGA. The district 
court also failed to find that the title defect was irremediable—it found only that a defect 
existed—and the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reconsideration presented 
new material evidence that the City could in fact have cleared the title when the time 
arrived for it to convey the UGA Property. 
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Because the district court failed to consider this Utah law, a "manifest 
injustice" resulted when the court did not reconsider its prior ruling. The Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Reconsideration should have been granted, and the ruling of the 
district court should be reversed. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING 
BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN DAMAGES. 
If this Court concludes that the Agreement provided consideration for the 
UGA Property and that the City breached the Agreement, the district court erred in 
calculating damages. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court stated that the UGA 
"is entitled to the value of what it bargained for, that is, a lot that could be sold for its 
highest use," and went on to award the UGA $158,441, which it determined to be the fair 
market value of the lot. R. 446. The district court, however, made no deductions from 
what it found to be the value of the UGA Property. 
Under a correct measure of benefit-of-the-bargain damages, the value of the 
property should have been reduced by the amount the UGA was supposed to pay for it 
and any other costs the UGA avoided by not having to perform. See Bitzes v. Sunset 
Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 71 (Utah 1982) (damages are difference between contract price 
and market value); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) ("Damages are 
properly measured by the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed."); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 
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150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (expectation 
interest damages must be reduced by uany cost or other loss . . . avoided by not having to 
perform")- The district court did not even examine what the UGA was supposed to pay 
for the property. 
The one clear cost the UGA avoided by not having to perform, and which 
the district court should have deducted, would have been the present value of the amounts 
the UGA would have paid over the life of a 20-year lease. R. 565 at 139-40. Because the 
district court made no deductions from the value of the UGA Property, it essentially 
awarded the UGA a double recovery, i.e., a $158,441 cash award and forgiveness of 
whatever amount it should have paid or costs it would have incurred under the 
Agreement. "Such a double recovery [is] contrary to the benefit of the bargain rule," 
Brown, 840 P.2d at 150-51, and it results in an even more egregious violation of Utah law 
than the original agreement contemplated by the parties. 
Thus, even if the district court properly found that the Agreement was 
supported by consideration and that the City breached the Agreement, the district court's 
calculation of damages should be reversed and the matter remanded for a recalculation of 
damages. 
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VII. IF THE CITY PREVAILS, THE COURT SHOULD AWARD IT 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AND REMAND FOR A 
CALCULATION OF SUCH. 
The Use Agreement provides for attorney fees and costs to the prevailing 
party in litigation. R. 20. The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the UGA. 
R. 550. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees and costs incurred on 
this appeal and in the district court. In that case, the Court should remand to the district 
court for a calculation of attorney fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the City asks that this Court reverse the district 
court's judgment and the rulings underlying that judgment. If the Court, however, agrees 
with the district court that the Agreement had sufficient consideration and that the City 
breached the Agreement, the Court should remand to the district court for a recalculation 
of damages. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this Court and in the district court. 
DATED this 26th day of April, 2002. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. jfeokifls 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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I hereby certify that on this 26th day of April, 2002,1 caused to be mailed, 
through the U.S. mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants, 
to the following: 
Lester A. Perry, Esq. 
Hoole & King, L.C. 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-7557 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
LESTER A. PERRY (2571) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION. INC.. a Utah 
non-profit corporation; 
Plaintiff. 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 




Civil No. 00 0*7 0 03*101 
Judge j l 
For cause of action, the plaintiff complains against the defendants as follows: 
I. Parties and Jurisdiction. 
1. The plaintiff, Utah Golf Association, Inc. (referred to herein as the "UGA"), is a Utah 
non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
2. The defendant, The City of North Salt Lake, Utah (referred to herein as "North Salt 
Lake City" and the "City"), is a Utah municipal corporation, with its principal place of business in 
Davis County, state of Utah. 
3. The defendant, The City of North Salt Lake. Utah, Municipal Building Authority 
(referred to herein as "North Salt Lake Building Authority"), is a Utah non-profit corporation with 
its principal place of business in Davis County, state of Utah. North Salt Lake City and North Salt 
Lake Building Authority are collectively referred to herein as "North Salt Lake". 
4. The contract that is the subject of this lawsuit was signed by the UGA in Salt Lake 
County, state of Utah. 
II. First Cause of Action - Breach of Contract. 
5. Prior to March 31,1992, North Salt Lake and a group of real estate developers were 
engaged in the development of a large residential area of North Salt Lake City. This area is located 
around the present Eaglewood Golf Course, high on the east bench of North Salt Lake City. 
6. In order to add value to the development for the developers and to provide recreation 
and open space to Nonh Salt Lake City's residents, the developers and the City included a golf 
course in their development plans. 
7. North Salt Lake City was to build the golf course and pay for the construction 
through a development bond. 
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8. The UGA is the state of Utah's member/representative with the United State's Golf 
Association, the governing body for the sport of golf in the United States, and, along with the Royal 
and Ancient Golf Association in England, the governing body for the sport throughout the world. 
9. The presence of the UGA at the golf course would add credibility to the City's plans 
to build a golf course and greatly aid North Salt Lake in obtaining funding for the golf course. 
10. As an inducement to convince the UGA to move its headquarters and the Utah Golf 
Hall of Fame to the golf course, the developers and North Salt Lake agreed to transfer a building lot 
next to the golf course to the UGA, which building lot could be used by the UGA to build its own 
office building in the future or could be sold in the open market by the UGA. 
11. The developers and/or North Salt Lake prepared a written contract to be signed by 
the parties. 
12. On or about March 31, 1999, the contract was executed by North Salt Lake City, 
North Salt Lake Building Authority and the UGA. The contract is called "Office Use Agreement" 
and a copy of the contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
13. The original contract included an addendum called "First Addendum to Office Use 
Agreement" (referred to herein as the "First Addendum"). A copy of the First Addendum is attached 
hereto within Exhibit "A". 
14. The City obtained its funding for the golf course and its club house and commenced 
their construction. 
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15. During the construction of the club house, the City discovered that it had mis-planned 
the club house. Among the problems that were discovered were that the club house was not large 
enough and the pro shop was in the wrong place. (The starter could not see the first tee from the pro 
shop.) 
16. North Salt Lake approached the UGA and requested that the UGA aid them in 
redesigning certain portions of the club house and relocating the pro shop into some of the space 
originally allocated to the UGA under the contract. 
17. The UGA agreed to the changes and the golf course and club house were completed. 
18. The UGA moved its headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame to the club house. 
19. Another addendum was prepared to reflect these changes. This addendum is called 
"Second Addendum to Office Use Agreement" and a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
20. Both of the Addendums indicate that North Salt Lake Building Authority is the fee 
title owner of the building lot promised to the UGA. Both Addendums indicate that the building lot 
consists of 18,975 square feet and is 115' x 165'. The building lot is located on the east side of the 
golf course parking lot. 
21. Both of the Addendums indicate that this building lot is the "UGA property" and shall 
be zoned "Restricted Conditional Use*'. Such zoning allowed office buildings as a conditional use 
and single family dwellings as a permitted use. Such uses conformed with the understanding of the 
UGA at the time it negotiated the contract. 
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22. Both of the Addendums provided that the UGA could choose either to build its own 
office building on the lot or sell the lot in the open market for the best price that it could obtain and 
keep the proceeds from the sale. 
23. In 1997, North Salt Lake expressed to the UGA its need for expanded food service 
areas at the golf course. North Salt Lake approached the UGA about building its office building on 
the building lot, which office building would include a dining room and food preparation area that 
would be leased by the City. 
24. To cooperate with this planned expansion, the UGA hired an architect to design an 
office building for the UGA which was to be built on the lot. The UGA paid approximately 
$3,000.00 for his plans. 
25. North Salt Lake then decided that it did not want to lease any portion of the proposed 
UGA office building, but would rather expand the present club house and again realign the UGA 
offices in the club house so that the City could add to its food service area. The UGA could not 
afford to build the planned office building without a tenant for a portion of the building. Thus the 
UGA abandoned its plans to build the office building and simply lost the $3,000.00 paid to the 
architect. 
26. In the latter part of 1998, the UGA discovered that North Salt Lake did not own the 
building lot at the time the contract was executed and that the building lot had only recently been 
acquired from the Cannon family. 
5 
27. The Cannon family was part of the group of developers who were working with North 
Salt Lake to develop the golf course and the surrounding residential area. 
28. The UGA then discovered that the Cannon family deeded a building lot to the City 
in 1997 by a special warranty deed and the deed contained a significant land use restriction. The 
UGA also discovered that the lot deeded by the Cannon family included only 17,768 square feet, not 
the 18,975 square feet agreed to in the contract and its addendums. A copy of this Special Warranty 
Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit UC". 
29. The land use restriction in the deed was that the building lot could only be used for 
a golf course or for an office building owned by the UGA. If the lot was used for any other purpose, 
the title to the lot would revert back to the Cannon family. 
30. This land use restriction gutted the value of the building lot to the UGA, because its 
highest and best use was a residential building lot and the UGA could not sell the lot with the deed 
restriction on the record title. 
31. The UGA informed North Salt Lake, at the 1997 meeting, that it expected the full 
building lot to be transferred to it free and clear of any such deed restriction, as required by the 
contract and the two addendums. 
32. The original term of the Office Use Agreement expired in 1999. The UGA desired 
that a long term extension of the Agreement be entered into as required by the Agreement. The 
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UGA notified North Salt Lake that any long term agreement had to include transfer of the full 
building lot to the UGA without the deed restriction so that the lot could be sold by the UGA. 
33. North Salt Lake decided to treat the UGA as a month to month tenant until it could 
resolve the dispute with the UGA. During this month to month tenancy, North Salt Lake considered 
all other terms of the Agreement to be in full force and effect. 
34. The parties tried to resolve the problem during 1999. North Salt Lake eventually 
failed to remove the deed restriction from the building lot and obtain the additional land that it was 
obligated to transfer to the UGA. Because of this, North Salt Lake refused to transfer the full lot 
without the restriction. The UGA stood by its contractual right to the full lot without the deed 
restriction. 
3 5. North Salt Lake then evicted the UGA and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame from the club 
house. 
36. The fair market value of an 18,975 square foot lot is believed to be 5227,700.00. 
North Salt Lake has damaged the UGA by this amount. 
37. The UGA has also incurred the following approximate damages because of North Salt 
Lake's eviction: 1) $40,000.00 in moving and relocation expenses for the UGA offices and the Utah 
Golf Hall of Fame; 2) $10,000.00 for display cabinets for the Hall of Fame and storage of Hall of 
Fame items during the move; 3) $40,000.00 business disruption costs and expenses: and 4) 
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$3,000.00 lost golf course revenue under the Agreement. These damages total approximately 
$93,000.00. 
38. The UGA has not yet negotiated a long term agreement with another landlord for its 
headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame. It is believed that when such an agreement is finalized 
that the rent that will need to be paid will greatly exceed the rent that was to be charged under the 
Office Use Agreement with North Salt Lake. Any such additional rent will be damages to the UGA. 
39. Pursuant to the terms of the Office Use Agreement, the UGA is entitled to 
reimbursement of all of its attorney's fees and court costs incurred herein. 
III. Second Cause of Action - Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing. 
40. In the Office Use Agreement and its addendums, there was an implied covenant 
between the parties to deal reasonably, fairly and in good faith with each other. 
41. North Salt Lake breached this implied covenant by: 1) failing to have title to the full 
building lot, thereby having the ability to perform its obligations, before executing the Agreement; 
2) by failing to negotiate a long term extension of the Agreement with the UGA in a manner that 
would not deprive the UGA of its right to the 18,975 square foot building lot without any deed 
restriction; and 3) by evicting the UGA. 
42. This breach of the covenant caused the above alleged damages to the UGA. 
Wherefore, the UGA prays the Court for judgment against the defendants, jointly and 
severally, as follows: 
8 
1. For the value of the 18,975 square foot lot of approximately $227,700.00; 
2. For approximately $125,525.00 in other damages: 
3. For approximately $200,000.00 for the added rent that will need to be paid to replace 
the space provided by North Salt Lake; 
4. For all court costs and attorney's fees incurred herein; 
5. For prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the damages: and 
6. For such further relief deemed just and equitable by the Court. 
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1. PARTIES. 
This Agreement, dated, for reference purposes only, March «~2 1 . 1992, is made by and between 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation (herein called "City") and 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit corporation (herein called "User"). 
2. PREMISES. 
City does hereby grant to User the exclusive right to use, but not possession of, that certain office space 
on the first and second floors of the clubhouse to be constructed at the proposed North Salt Lake Golf Course 
(herein called "Premises"), a site plan of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference thereto is 
made a pan hereof, said Premises being agreed, for the purposes of this Agreement, to have an area of 
approximately 2,424 square feet; the Premises shall consist of eight offices, a reception area, a conference room, 
and one private restroom; said building shall be constructed upon property in the City of North Salt Lake, 
County of Davis, State of Utah, the legal description of which property is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and by 
reference thereto if; made a pan hereof. City has leased the Premises and other property from the City of North 
Salt Lake, Utah, Municipal Building Authority, a Utah non-profit corporation ("Building Authority"). This 
Agreement transfers no interest whatsoever, leasehold or otherwise, in the Premises and User is not entitled to 
possession of the Premises. User obtains by this Agreement a license to use the Premises solely for the purposes 
described herein, [t is also hereby acknowledged by both City and User that Building Authority has not yet 
acquired the real propeny upon which the Premises will be constructed, however Building Authority has entered 
into agreements to acquire said real property provided that Building Authority is successful in procuring 
sufficient financing for the acquisition and construction of the proposed municipal golf course. The obligations 
of both City and User herein are hereby made subject to Building Authority obtaining municipal bond financing 
in the principal amount of at least $5,910,000 and Building Authority receiving fee simple title to the real 
property upon which the Premises shall be constructed. Said Agreement is subject to the terms, covenants and 
conditions herein set forth and the User covenants as a material pan of the consideration for this Agreement to 
keep and perform each and all of said terms, covenants and conditions by it to be kept and performed and that 
this Agreement is made upon the condition of said performance. 
3. TERM. 
(a) Commencement and Ending Hate of Term. The right to use the Premises and the user fee obligation 
shall commence on the date thirty (30) days after City, or City's supervising contractor, notifies User in 
writing that City's construction obligations respecting the Premises have been fulfilled to the extent that, 
in City's opinion, the Premises are ready for the use contemplated by User under this Agreement. The 
Agreement Term shall thereafter continue for a period of FIVE (5) YEARS. 
The date which is applicable under the foregoing part of this Section 3(a) is hereinafter referred to as 
the "Commencement Date." Notwithstanding the foregoing, and subject to the provisions of Section 
30(xi) of this Agreement, if the Commencement Date has not arrived prior to DECEMBER 31, 1993, or 
if City has. not obtained financmg for the proposed golf course facility mentioned in Section 2, above, 
and received fee simple title to the real property upon which the Premises shall be constructed, User 
shall have the option to terminate this Agreement upon written notification to City as hereinafter 
provided. 
The term of this Agreement shall end on the last day of the Final Agreement Year, unless sooner 
terminated as hereinafter provided in this Agreement. 
(b) Agreement Year Defined. The term "Agreement Year" as used herein shall mean a period of twelve 
(12) full consecutive months. The first Agreement year shall begin on the Commencement Date if such 
date falls on the first day of a calendar month. Otherwise, the first Agreement Year shall commence on 
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r\£itwucm l u i n^aL ommence upon trie anniversary Gate oi trie l\t Agreement \car. 
4. USER FEE AND LATE CHARGES. 
User agrees to pay to City, without prior notice or demand, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND THREE 
HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($30,300.00) per year payable in equal monthly installments of TWO 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE AND NO/100 ($2,525.00) per^ month, which monthly 
installment is due on or before the first day of the each calendar month of the term hereof. The user fee for any 
period during the term hereof which is for less than one (I) month shall be a prorated portion of the monthly 
installment herein, based upon a thirty (30) day month. The user fee shall be paid to City, without deduction or 
offset, except as set forth herein, in lawful money of the United States of America, which shall be legal tender at 
the time of payment at the office of the City, or to such other person or at such other place as City may from 
time to time designate in writing. User hereby acknowledges that late payment by User to City of user fees or 
other sums due hereunder will cause City to incur costs not contemplated by this Agreement, the exact amount 
of which will be extremely difficult to ascertain. Such costs include, but are not limited to, processing and 
accounting charges, and late charges which may be imposed upon City by terms of any mortgage or trust deed 
covering the Premises. Accordingly, if any user fee payment or a sum due from User shall not be received by 
City or City's designee within TEN (10) days of the due date thereof, User shall pay to City a late charge equal 
to ten percent (10%) of such overdue amount. The parties hereby agree that such late charges represent a fair 
and reasonable estimate of the cost that City will incur by reason of the late payment by User. Acceptance of 
such late charges by the City shall in no event constitute a waiver of User's default with respect to such overdue 
amount, nor prevent City from exercising any of the other rights and remedies granted hereunder. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event that, after receiving reasonable notice from User, the City fails to: (a) 
provide services, utilities, maintenance, and repairs as required under this Agreement; or (b) diligently pursue and 
prosecute its obligations under this Agreement, User hereby reserves the right to place the monthly user fee due 
under this Agreement in an interest bearing escrow account until the City has resolved or is diligently pursuing a 
resolution of the problem. 
5. SECURITY DEPOSIT. 
Upon execution of this Agreement User shall deposit with City the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE 
HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($2,525.00). Said sum shall be held by City as security 
for the faithful performance by User of all the terms, covenants, and conditions of this Agreement to be kept and 
performed by User during the term hereof. If User defaults with respect to any provision of this Agreement, 
including, but not limited to the provisions relating to the payment of user fees, City may: 1) elect to retain the 
security deposit until the Agreement has expired; or 2)without being required to do so, use, apply or retain all or 
any part of this security deposit for the payment of any user fee or any other sum in default, or for the payment 
of any amount which City may spend or become obligated to spend by reason of User's default, or to 
compensate City for any other loss or damage which City may suffer by reason of User's default. If any portion 
of said deposit is so used or applied, User shall within five (5) days after written demand therefor, deposit cash 
with City in an amount sufficient to restore the security deposit to its original amount and User's failure to do so 
shall be a material breach of this Agreement. City shall not be required to keep this security deposit separate 
from its general funds, and User shall not be entitled to interest on such deposit. If User shall fully and 
faithfully perform every provision of this Agreement to be performed by it, the security deposit or any balance 
thereof shall be returned to User at the expiration of the Agreement term. In the event of termination of City's 
interest in this Agreement, City shall transfer said deposit to City's successor in interest. 
6. OPERATING EXPENSE ADJUSTMENTS. 
For the purposes of this Article, the following terms are defined as follows: 
Base Year Direct Expenses: The Base Year Direct Expenses include ail direct costs of operation and 
maintenance, as determined by standard accounting practices, and includes the following costs by way 
of illustration, but not limited to: real property taxes and assessments; rent taxes, gross receipt taxes, 
(whether assessed against the Building Authority or assessed against the User and collected by the 
Building Authority, or both); water and sewer charges; insurance premiums; utilities; management fees; 
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maintenance; supplier, materials; equipment; and tools; including m^ienance, costs, and upkeep of ail 
parking and common areas. ("Direct Expenses" shall not include depreciation on the Building of which 
the Premises are a pan or equipment therein, loan payments, structural repairs or replacements, 
advertising fees, consulting or marketing fees, costs of refinancing or mongage fees, leasing of 
equipment not directly related to maintenance and repair of the Premises or its common areas, legal 
fees, executive salaries or real estate brokers' commissions.) 
Comparison Year: Each calendar year of the term after the Base Year. 
Direct Expenses: All direct costs of operation and maintenance, as determined by standard accounting 
practices, and shall include the following costs by way of illustration, but not be limited to: real 
property taxes and assessments; rent taxes, gross receipt taxes, (whether assessed against the Building 
Authority or assessed against the User and collected by the Building Authority, or both); water and 
sewer charges; insurance premiums; utilities; management fees; labor; costs incurred in the management 
of the Building, if any; air conditioning and heating; elevator maintenance; supplies; materials; 
equipment; and tools; including maintenance, costs, and upkeep of all parking and common areas. 
("Direct Expenses" shall not include depreciation on the Building of which the Premises are a part or 
equipment therein, loan payments, structural repairs or replacements, advertising fees, consulting or 
marketing fees, costs of refinancing or mortgage fees, leasing of equipment not directly related to 
maintenance and repair of the Premises or its common areas, legal fees, executive salaries or real estate 
brokers' commissions.) 
If the Direct Expenses paid or incurred by the City for the Comparison Year on account of the operation 
or maintenance of the Building of which the Premises are a pan are in excess of the Base Year Direct Expenses, 
then the User shall pay its pro rata share of the increase. This percentage is that portion of the total useable area 
of the Building used by the User hereunder. City shall endeavor to give to User on or before the first day of 
March of each year following the respective Comparison Year a statement of the increase in fees payable by 
User hereunder, but failure by City to give such statement by said date shall not constitute a waiver by City of 
its right to require an increase in user fees. Upon receipt of the statement for the first Comparison Year, User 
shall pay in fall the total amount of increase due for the first Comparison Year, and in addition for the then 
current year, the amount of any such increase shall be used as an estimate for said current year and this amount 
shall be divided into twelve (12) equal monthly installments and User shall pay to City, concurrently with the 
regular monthly user fee payment next due Mowing the receipt of such statement, an amount equal to one (1) 
monthly installment multiplied by the number of months from January in the calendar year in which said 
statement is submitted to the month of such payment, both months inclusive. Subsequent installments shall be 
payable concurrently with the regular monthly user fee payments for the balance of that calendar year and shall 
continue until the next Comparison Year's statement is rendered. If the next or any succeeding Comparison Year 
results in a greater increase in Direct Expenses, then upon receipt of a statement from City, User shall pay a 
lump sum equal to such total increase in Direa Expenses over the Base Year Direa Expenses, less the total of 
the monthly installments of estimated increases paid in the previous calendar year for which comparison is then 
being made to the Base Year Direct Expenses; and the estimated monthly installments to be paid for the next 
year, Mowing said Comparison Year, shall be adjusted to reflect such increase. If in any Comparison Year the 
User's share of Direct Expenses be less than the preceding year, then upon receipt of City's statement, any 
overpayment made by User on the monthly installment basis provided above shall be credited towards the next 
monthly user fee payment falling due and the estimated monthly installments of Direa Expenses to be paid shall 
be adjusted to reflea such lower Direct Expenses for the most recent Comparison Year. Notwithstanding 
anything contained in this Article to the contrary, it is hereby agreed that User shall not be obligated to pay any 
increases in Direa Expenses attributable to management fees; labor; costs incurred in the management of the 
Building; air conditioning maintenance; heating maintenance; elevator maintenance; supplies; materials; 
equipment; and tools; including maintenance, costs, and upkeep of all parking and common areas, where such 
increases exceed the cumulative increase in the Consumer Price Index ("CPI Cap") since the Commencement 
Date. However it is understood and agreed that there shall be no such CPI Op on increases in Direct Expenses 
attributable to real property taxes and assessments, rent taxes, gross receipt taxes, water and sewer charges, 
insurance premiums, and utilities. 
Even though the term has expired and User has discontinued use of the Premises, when the final 
determination is made of User's share of Direa Expenses for the year in which this Agreement terminates, User 
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in the event said expenses decease shall be immediately rebated by Ciiy to 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, the user fee payable by User shall in no event be 
less than as specified in Article 5 hereinabove. 
7. CONSTRUCTION. 
(a) Improvements, [f the Premises and the building containing the same are not currently in existence, City 
shall, at its own cost and expense, construct and complete said building and certain improvements to 
Premises for User's use, incorporating in such construction all applicable items of work described in 
Exhibit nC". In addition, User, at its own cost and expense, shall construct and install its fixtures and 
equipment and shall perform the other work set forth on Exhibit "C" incorporating in such construction 
all applicable items of work described on Exhibit "C\ User shall have the right to enter the Premises 
and to obtain keys thereto to perform User's work prior to the commencement date but after City has 
given notice pursuant to Section 3; in so doing, however, User shall comply with direction of the City 
and shall not interfere with any of City's construction activities. During such entry all of User's 
obligations hereunder, except the obligation to pay user fees, shall be in full force and effect. Any work 
other than or in addition to the items specifically enumerated as City's work on Exhibit "C" shall be 
performed by User at its own cost and expense and only after obtaining written consent from City, 
which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. City shall cause all of the construction which is to 
be performed by it to be completed, and the Premises ready for User to install its fixtures and 
equipment and to perform the other work described on Exhibit "C" as soon as reasonably possible, but 
in no event later than December 31, 1993. Subject to the provisions of Section 30(xi), in the event 
City's construction obligations have not been fulfilled by December 31, 1993; or if City has not obtained 
financing for the proposed golf course facility mentioned in Section 2, above, and received fee simple 
title to the real property upon which the Premises shall be constructed, User shall have the right to 
exercise any right or remedy available to it under applicable law, including the right to terminate this 
Agreement, except that under no circumstances shall City be liable to User for any incidental or 
consequential loss or damage to User resulting from delay in construction. 
(b) Changes to Golf Course rVvHopmoit City hereby reserves the right at any time to make changes, 
alterations or additions, in or on the building in which the Premises are contained, anywhere on the Site 
Plan shown on Exhibit "A", or elsewhere in the Golf Course Development. User shall not, in such 
event, claim or be allowed any damages or right to terminate this Agreement for injury or inconvenience 
occasioned thereby. 
8. USE. 
User shall use the Premises solely for general office purposes and for the home of the Utah Golf Hall of 
Fame. User shall not use or permit the Premises to be used for any other purpose without the prior written 
consent of City. User shall not do or permit anything to be done in or about the Premises nor bring or keep 
anything therein which will in any way increase the existing rate of or affea any fire or other insurance upon the 
Building or any of its contents, or cause cancellation of any insurance policy covering said Building or any part 
thereof or any of its contents. User shall not do or permit anything to be done in or about the Premises which 
will in any way obstruct or interfere with the rights of other tenants or occupants of the Building or injure or 
annoy them or use or allow the Premises to be used for any improper, immoral, unlawful or objectionable 
purpose, nor shall User cause, maintain or permit any nuisance in, on or about the Premises. User shall not 
commit or suffer to be committed any waste in or upon the Premises. 
9. COMPLIANCE WITH LAW. 
User shall not use the Premises or permit anything to be done in or about the Premises which will in 
any way conflict with any law, statute, ordinance or governmental rule or regulation now in force or which may 
hereafter be enacted or promulgated. User shall, at its sole cost and expense, promptly comply with all laws, 
statutes, ordinances and governmental rules, regulations or requirements now in force or which may hereafter be 
in force, and with the requirements of any board of fire insurance underwriters or other similar bodies now or 
hereafter constituted, relating to, or affecting the condition, use or occupancy of the Premises, excluding 
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competent jurisdiction or the admission of User in any action against User, v^cther City be a party thereto or 
not, that User has violated any law, statute, ordinance or governmental rule, regulation or requirement, shall be 
conclusive of that fact as between the City and User. 
10. ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS. 
City and User shall make improvements to the Premises as set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and 
by reference thereto is made a part hereof. Subsequent to the installation of the improvements set forth in 
Exhibit "C, User shall not make or suffer to be made any alterations, additions or improvements to or of the 
Premises or any part thereof without the written consent of City first had and obtained and any alterations, 
additions or improvements to or of said Premises, including, but not limited to, wall covering, paneling and 
built-in cabinet work, but excepting movable furniture and trade fixtures, shall on the expiration of the term 
become a part of the realty and belong to the City and shall be surrendered with the Premises. In the event City 
consents to the making of any alterations, additions or improvements to the Premises by User, the same shall be 
made by User at User's sole cost and expense, and any contractor or person selected by User to make the same 
must first be approved of in writing by the City. Upon approving any additional alterations or additions to be 
installed by User, City shall also designate which items shall be removed by User, at User's expense, upon 
termination of this Agreement. Upon the expiration or sooner termination of the term hereof, User shall, upon 
written demand by City, given at least thirty (30) days prior to the end of the term, at User's sole cost and 
expense, forthwith and with all due diligence remove any alterations, additions, or improvements made by User, 
previously designated by City to be removed, and User shall, forthwith and with all diligence at its sole cost and 
expense, repair any damage to the Premises caused by such removal. 
11. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS. 
(a) User shall, at User's sole cost and expense, keep the Premises and every pan thereof in good condition 
and repair, damage thereto from causes beyond the reasonable control of User and ordinary wear and 
tear excepted. Except as specifically provided In an addendum, if any, to this Agreement, City shall 
have no obligation whatsoever to alter, remodel, improve, repair, decorate or paint the Premises or any 
part thereof and the panics hereto affirm that City has made no representations to User respecting the 
condition of the Premises or the Building except as specifically herein set forth. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 11(a) hereinabove, it is mutually understood by all parties 
hereto that City is obligated to maintain and repair the common areas, landscaping and all of the 
building systems unless any damage thereto results from the negligent or willful acts of the User. City 
shall repair and maintain the structural portions of the Building, including the basic plumbing, air 
conditioning, heating, and electrical systems, installed or furnished by City, unless such maintenance and 
repairs aire caused in part or in whole by the act, neglect, fault or omissions of any duty by the User, its 
agents, servants, employees or invitees, in which case User shall pay to City the reasonable cost of such 
maintenance and repairs. City shall not be liable for any failure to make any such repairs or to perform 
any maintenance unless such failure shall persist for an unreasonable time after written notice of the 
need of such repairs or maintenance is given to City by User. User agrees to provide, at its sole cost, 
janitorial and cleaning services to the Premises. Except as provided in Article 22 hereof, there shall be 
no abatement of user fees and no liability in or to any portion of the Building or the Premises or in or 
to fixtures, appurtenances and equipment therein. User waives the right to make repairs at City's 
expense under any law, statute or ordinance now or hereafter in effect. 
12. LIENS. 
User shall keep the Premises and the property in which the Premises are situated free from any liens 
arising out of any work performed, materials furnished or obligations incurred by User. City may require, at 
City's sole option, that User shall provide to City either a cash bond or, at User's sole cost and expense, a lien 
and completion bond. The cash bond or the lien and completion bond shall both be in an amount equal to one 
and one-half (1-1/2) times of any and all estimated cost of any improvements, additions, or alterations in the 
Premises, to insuie City against any liability for mechanics' and materialmen's liens and to insure completion of 
the work. 
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User shall not either voluntarily or by operation of law, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate 
or encumber this Agreement or any interest therein, and shall not sublicense the said Premises or any pan thereof 
without first obtaining the written consent of the City, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
14. HOLD HARMLESS. 
(a) User to Hold City Harml^ User shall indemnify and hold harmless City against any and all claims 
arising from User's use of the Premises for the conduct of its business or from any activity, work, or 
other thing done, permitted or suffered by the User in or about the Building, and shall further indemnify 
and hold harmless City against and from any and all claims arising from any breach or default in the 
performance of any obligation on User's pan to be performed under the terms of this Agreement, or 
arising from any act or negligence of the User, or any officer, agent, employee, guest, or invitee of 
User, and from all and against all cost, attorney's fees, expenses and liabilities incurred in or about any 
such claim or any action or proceeding brought thereon, and, in any case, action or proceeding be 
brought against City by reason of any such claim, User upon notice from City, shall defend the same at 
User's expense by counsel reasonably satisfactory to City. User as a material pan of the consideration 
to City hereby assumes ail risk of damage to property or injury to persons, in, upon or about the 
Premises, from any cause other than City's negligence, and User hereby waives all claims in respect 
thereof against City. 
(b) City to Hold User Harml*^ City shall indemnify and hold harmless User against any and all claims 
arising from City's use of the Premises for the conduct of its business or from any activity, work, or 
other thing done, permitted or suffered by the City in or about the Building, and shall further indemnify 
and hold harmless User against and from any and all claims arising from any breach or default in the 
performance of any obligation on City's pan to be performed under the terms of this Agreement, or 
arising from any act or negligence of the City, or any officer, agent, employee, guest, or invitee of City, 
and from all and against all cost, attorney's fees, expenses and liabilities incurred in or about any such 
claim or any action or proceeding brought thereon, and, in any case, action or proceeding be brought 
against User by reason of any such claim, City upon notice from User, shall defend the same at City's 
expense by counsel reasonably satisfactory to User. City agrees to indemnify and hold User harmless 
from any damages resulting from the negligence of User or its agents. City or its agents shall 
not be liable for any damage to propeny entrusted to employees of the Building, nor for loss or damage 
to any propeny by theft or otherwise, nor for any injury to or damage to persons or property resulting 
from fire, explosion, falling plaster, steam, gas, electricity, water or rain which may leak from any pan 
of the Building or from the pipes, appliances or plumbing works therein or from the roof, street or 
subsurface or from any other place resulting from dampness or any other cause whatsoever, unless 
caused by or due to the negligence of City, its agents, servants or employees. City or its agents shall 
not be liable for interference with the light or other incorporeal hereditaments, loss of business by User, 
nor shall City be liable for any latent defect in the Premises or in the Building. User shall give prompt 
notice to City in case of fire or accidents in the Premises or in the Building or of defects therein or in 
the fixtures or equipment. 
15. SUBROGATION. 
As long as their respective insurers so permit, City and User hereby mutually waive their respective 
rights of recovery against each other for any loss insured by fire, extended coverage and other propeny insurance 
policies existing for the benefit of the respective panies. Each pany shall obtain any special endorsements, if 
required by their insurer, to evidence compliance with the aforementioned waiver. 
16. LIABILITY INSURANCE. 
Both City and User shall each, at their own expense, obtain and keep in force during the term of this 
Agreement a separate policy of comprehensive public liability insurance in the amount of $500,000.00 insuring 
each other against any liability arising out of the ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance of the Premises and 
all areas appunenant thereto. The limit of said insurance shall not, however, limit the liability of the either pany 
hereunder. Said insurance may be pan of a blanket policy, providing, however, said insurance by User shall 
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18. PROPERTY TAXES. 
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 d 
the Premises. In the event any or all of the User's " W ^ , * ^ ^ ^ S r e of such taxes 
personal property shall be assessed and taxed with the Buildmg, U«r shaH pay * W ^ ^ 
within ten (10) days after delivery to User by City of a statement in writing setting rortn 
taxes applicable to User's property. 
19. RULES AND REGULATIONS. 
„ „ shall fai,hf„lly Ota*™ a»d comply with ,hc n t o ^ " ^ f ° » ' ^ " ^ t £ t to. » 
A ^ - . as *hibi, -D- a»d * » * — * « . » « * ^ ^ » J
 m « ^ I ( , J ? . * , shall b. 
time to make all reasonable modifications to said rules. The additions <m 
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nuupciiurmancc 01 any said niiw by any other occupants. 
20. ENTRY BY CITY. 
City shall at any and all times and, upon reasonable notice to the User, have the right to enter the 
Premises, inspect the same, supply janitorial service and any other service to be provided by City to User 
hereunder, to post notices of non-responsibility, and to alter, improve or repair thq Premises and any portion of 
the Building of which the Premises are a part that City may deem necessary or desirable, and may for that 
purpose erect scaffolding and other necessary structures where reasonably required by the character of the work 
to be performed, always providing that the entrance to the Premises shall not be blocked thereby, and further 
providing that the business of the User shall not be interfered with unreasonably. User hereby waives any claim 
for damages or for any injury or inconvenience to or interference with User's business, any loss of occupancy or 
quiet enjoyment of the Premises, and any other loss occasioned thereby. For each of the aforesaid purposes, City 
shall at all times have and retain a key with which to unlock all of the doors in, upon and about the Premises, 
excluding User's vaults, safes and files, and City shall have the right to use any and ail means which City may 
deem proper to open said doors in an emergency, in order to obtain entry to the Premises without liability to 
City except for any failure to exercise due care for User's property. Any entry to the Premises obtained by City 
by any of said means, or otherwise shall not under any circumstances be construed or deemed to be a forcible or 
unlawful entry into, or a detainer of, the Premises, or an eviction of User from the Premises or any portion 
thereof. 
21. RECONSTRUCTION. 
In the event the Premises or the Building of which the Premises are a part are damaged by fire or other 
perils covered by extended coverage insurance, City agrees to forthwith repair the same; and this Agreement 
shall remain in full force and effect, except that User shall be entitled to a proportionate reduction of the user fee 
while such repairs are being made, such proportionate reduction to be based upon the extent to which the making 
of such repairs shall materially interfere with the business carried on by the User in the Premises. If the damage 
is due to the fault or neglect of User or its employees, there shall be no abatement of user fees. 
In the event the Premises or the Building of which the Premises are a part are damaged as a result of 
any cause other than the perils covered by fire and extended coverage insurance, then City shall forthwith repair 
the same, provided the extent of the destruction be less than ten percent (10%) of the then full replacement cost 
of the Premises or the Building of which the Premises are a part. In the event the destruction of the Premises or 
the Building is to an extent greater than ten percent (10%) of the full replacement cost, then City shall have the 
option: (1) to repair or restore such damage, this Agreement continuing in full force and effect, but the user fee 
to be proportionately reduced as hereinabove in this Article provided; or (2) give notice to User at any time 
within sixty (60) days after such damage terminating this Agreement as of the date specified in such notice, 
which date shall be no less than thirty (30) and no more than sixty (60) days after the giving of such notice. In 
the event of giving such notice, this Agreement shall expire on the date so specified in such notice and the user 
fee, reduced by a proportionate amount, based upon the extent, if any, to which such damage materially 
interfered with the business carried on by the User in the Premises, shall be paid up to date of such termination. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Article, City shall not have any obligation 
whatsoever to repair, reconstruct or restore the Premises when the damage resulting from any casualty covered 
under this Article occurs during the last twelve (12) months of the term of this Agreement or any extension 
thereof. City shall not be required to repair any injury or damage by fire or other cause, or to make any repairs 
or replacements of any panels, decoration, office fixtures, railings, floor covering, partitions, or any other 
property installed in the Premises by User. The User shall not be entitled to any compensation or damages from 
City for loss of the use of the whole or any part of the Premises, User's personal property or any inconvenience 
or annoyance occasioned by such damage, repair, reconstruction or restoration. 
22. DEFAULT. 
The occurrence of any one or more of the following events shall constitute a default and breach of this 
Agreement by User. 
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(a) Discontinuing use of .. Premises by User. 
(b) The failure by User to make any payment of user fees or any other payment required to be made by 
User hereunder, within TEN (10) days of the due date thereof. 
(c) The failure by User to observe or perform any of the covenants, conditions or provfaions <of t t e 
k
 Agreement to be observed or performed by the User, other than descrtbed in Articl' ^ > * ° * ' ^ 
2 d , failure shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days after wrmer n.nce *£**<** <° U s e r ' 
provided, however, that if the nature of User's default is such that m e than thirty30)days are 
reasonably required for its cure, then User shall not be deemed to be in default if User commences such 
cure within said thirty (30) day period and thereafter diligently prosecutes such cure to completion. 
(d) The making by User of any general assignment or general arrangement for the benefit of creditors; or 
the filing by or against User of a petition to have User adjudged a bankrupt, or a petition or 
reorganization or arrangement under any law relating to bankruptcy (unless, m the case °f a petition 
filed against User, the same is dismissed within sixty (60) days); or the appointment of a trus ee or a 
receiver to take possession of substantially all of User's assets located at the Premises or of Users 
interest in this Agreement, where possession is not restored to User within thirty (30) days; o « " 
Attachment, execution or other judicial seizure of substantially all of User's asset:; locatedat the Premises 
or of User's'interest in this Agreement, where such seizure is not discharged in thirty (30) days. 
23. REMEDIES IN DEFAULT. 
In the even, of any such material default or breach by User, City may at any time thereafter, with or 
without notice or demand and without limiting City in the exercise of a right or remedy which City may have by 
reason of such default or breach: 
(a) Terminate User's right to use the Premises by any lawful means, in which case this A g r e e d *aU 
terminate. In such event City shall be entitled to recover from User all damages incurred by City by 
reason of User's default. City shall also be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in an 
action for damages. Unpaid user fees or other sums shall bear interest from the date due at the rate ot 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum. 
(b) Pursue any other remedy now or hereafter available to City under the laws or judicial decision of the 
State in which the Premises are located. 
24. ESTOPPEL STATEMENT. 
User shall at any time and from time to time upon not less than ten (10) days' prior written notice from 
City execute, acknowledge and deliver to City a statement in writing, (a) certifying that this ^ e e m ^ * 
unmodified Lid in full force and effect (or, if modified, stating the nature of such modification and certifying 
Ztt-Agreement as so modified, is in fall force and effect), and the date to which the user fees a n d o t h ^ 
charges aVTpaid in advance, if any; and (b) acknowledging that there are not, to User's knowledgemy uncured 
defaults on the part of the City hereunder, or specifying such defaults if any are claimed; and (c) the 
clmencement Date and the Termination Date of this Agreement. Any such statement may_ be* « J « M £ ° * 
any prospective purchaser or encumbrancer of all or any portion of the real property of which the Premises are 
part. 
25. PARKING. 
User shall have the right to use the parking facilities of the Building subject «** f ' \ ™ * ^ ^ 
for such parking facilities which may be established or altered by City at any time or from time to time during 
the term hereof. 
26. CORPORATE AUTHORITY. 
Each individual executing this Agreement on behalf of said corporation represents and warrants that he 
is duly authorized to execute and deliver mis Agreement on behalf of said corporation, in accordance with a duly 
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 X £ r 5 ,of&tr°"of ,his A 8 ™ m e n ' -d -* **• •» »f •» » - * - » • * * 
^g™.=ni, apply „
 l n d b m d ,he he,IS_ s u c c = s s o n. t e x e c n ,o r s 1( iminisnators „d ^ . ^ o f ^  ^ ^ 
(viii)
 !£^£tt£Z ?£££"or a -fom — — (ix)
 tsxsz^z ts^jzr,hc *crnisesor Buil"s or—-
^ ^ " m a n ^ ' Z L ^ ^ T " ^ ^ ^ ° f ^  a S r e e m e n t S ° f t h e ^ h c r e t 0 w i l h re^ to 
S n a b l to Z l , °n C d m th lS A « r e c m e n t ' •*» n o 1*** agreements or understanding 
E S S * ondde?,1113"6" "J* ^ CffeCt iVe f ° r ^ PUrp0SC- N ° Pr 0 v i s i o n o f ^  AgreeLnt may 
S ^ - S ^ ^ *""shdl not be effective or bind^ « -y •»» » * 
( X 0
 S S f S u s e ^ e £ f e C m e m u r d ,hC ° b l i S a l i 0 n S ° f thC U s e r h e r e u n d e r sha11 no< be affected or 
^ T t a ^ l r o r H l y " U n a b' e t 0 t t i m " * ° f itS ° b U g a t i 0 n S h e r e u n d e r or » delaved in doing so, 
££ rSL^f2^T?^5^of ^labor ^ a a s of °*or ^  olhcr Jse 
( X i l )
 th'ilTeement V ? " ? ° f " * a C t i 0 n ° r p r 0 C e e d i n S brought by either party against the other under 
oHts^ornTs h I T ' § ^ ^ b e C m i t l c d t 0 reC0Ver ^ «*« « * e x P e n s « deluding the fees 
artoLysTees " " ^ ^ " SUCh ™ n n M t h e CTurt "»* a d i u ^ e n a b l e as 
( X l i i )
 ^ f ^ ^ f t t T f - ^ — ^ - y ^ of the Building, City shall thereafter 
obligations c a b i n e d i t f , I ^ ^ ° f ^  " ^ U n d e r ^ ^ «" o f i ts « * « » * - d 
o o S ^ ^ T Z c c l l ^ T fro- this Agreement arising out of any act, occurrence or omission 
interest or between A Z ? Y u * " * " a g r e C m C m b e t W e e n t h c P " 1 ^ o r t h e i r successors in 
- — — - ^ ^ r < c r £ 5 z r ™d -- - ~* -"»-
(xiv) ChnirrnfT^ T i^s Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
(XV)
 st^ ed t^uZsToZ ITaf **£**", °; °f thC dCVel0pmCnt ^ W h k h * e B u i l d ^ > 
Premises. P ^ ' ^ " m a d d r e S S o f , h e b u s i n e s s t0 ^  ~nduaed by the User in the 
W WITNESS UBEREOF. * . ^
 h m M ^  ^ ^ te ^ ^ „ ^ ^ ^ o n ^ 




dates spccuica lmmcuwiciy 
City: 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 














The Build Authority acknowledges this Agreement between the City and the User and hereby agrees 
that should the City default on its obligations owed to the Building Authority under the lease agreement benveen 
them, the Building Authority will nonetheless honor this Agreement and allow the User to continue to use the 
Premises for the duration of the Agreement Term. 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, 
a Utah non-profit corporation 
By: 
7). id- f-7//y//l>7*/tf S_ 
(print name) 
R Its f ^ g S I - D E N 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
FT/)OR PTAN OF PRFMISFS 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
LFHAT. nPSCRIPTTON OF THF PROPERTY 
UGA License Agnnt. 
- 1 4 - 03/26/92 
EXHIBIT "C" 
IMPROVFyTr^nr ORMCATTONS OF CITY AND USER 
City shall be responsible to furnish and install the following improvements after User has 






Walls sheetrocked, paint-ready 
Restroom finished 
All interior finish items except the following items to be completed by User. 
User shall be responsible for the following: 
(City will provide the following allowance for tenant improvements. Any improvements beyond the 
allowance indicated shall be the responsibility of User.) 
Carpeting $1.45/sq.ft. allowance 
Window Covering $ .85/sq.ft. allowance 
Painting, moldings, trims S2.10/sq.ft. allowance 
Total Allowance $4.40/sq.ft. 
It is agreed by the parties that the above improvement obligations plus the improvement 
allowance shall also apply to the 888 additional square feet of space provided for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame. 
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Rplf* anH Regulations 
1. No sign, placard, picture, advertisement, name or notice shall be inscribed, displayed or printed or 
affixed on or to any part of the outside or inside of the Building without the written consent of the City first had 
and obtained, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. All approved signs or lettering on doors shall 
be printed, painted, affixed or inscribed at the expense of the User. The User shall not place anything or allow 
anything to be placed near the glass of any window, door, partition or wall which may appear unsightly from 
outside the Premises; provided, however, that the City may furnish and install a Building standard window 
covering at ail exterior windows. The User shall not without prior written consent of the City cause or otherwise 
sunscreen any window. 
2. The sidewalks, halls, passages, exits, entrances, elevators and stairways shall not be obstructed by User 
or used for any purpose other than for ingress and egress from the Premises. 
3. The User shall not alter any lock or install any new or additional locks or any bolts on any doors or 
windows of the Premises without the prior consent of the City, which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. 
4. The toilet rooms, urinals, wash bowls and other apparatus shall not be used for any purpose other than 
for the purpose for which they were constructed and no foreign substance of any kind whatsoever shall be 
thrown therein and the expense of any breakage, stoppage, or damage resulting from the violation of this rule 
shall be borne by the User who, or whose employees or invitees shall have caused it. 
5. The User shall not overload the floor of the Premises or in any way deface the premises or any pan 
thereof. 
6. No furniture, freight or equipment of any kind shall be brought into the Building without the prior 
notice to the City and all moving of the same into or out of the Building shall be done at such time and in such 
manner as the City shall designate. The City shall have the right to prescribe the weight, size and position of all 
safes and other heavy equipment brought into the Building and also the times and manner of moving the same in 
and out of the Building. Safes or other heavy objects shall, if considered necessary by the City, shall stand on 
supports of such thickness as is necessary to properly distribute the weight, the City will not be responsible for 
loss of or damage to any such safe or property from any cause and ail damage done to the Building by movmg 
or maintaining any such safe or other property shall be repaired at the expense of the User. 
7. The User shall not use, keep or permit to be used or kept any foul or noxious gas or substance in the 
Premises, or permit or suffer any other person (the employees, agents, servants and invitees of User excepted) to 
occupy or use the said Premises, or any portion thereof, without the written consent of the City first had and 
obtained, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Consent to one assignment, sublicensing, 
occupation or use by any other person shall not be deemed to be a consent to any subsequent assignment, 
sublicensing, occupation or use by another person. 
8. No cooking shall be done or permitted by User on the Premises, except for microwave cooking by 
User's employees or coffee pots, nor shall the Premises be used for the storage of merchandise, for washing 
clothes, for lodging, or for any improper, objectionable or immoral purposed. 
9. The User shall not use or keep in the Premises or the Building any kerosene, gasoline or inflammable or 
combustible fluid or material, or use any method of heating or air conditioning other than that supplied by the 
City. 
10. The City will direct electricians as to where and how telephone and telegraph wires are to be 
introduced. No boring or cutting for wires will be allowed without the consent of the City. The location of 
telephones, call boxes and other office equipment affixed to the Premises shall be subject to the approval of the 
City, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
11. When the Building is not in use the Building shall be locked and access thereto shall be limited to 
Building Users or employees of Building Users and their guests, which Users or User's employees have keys to 
UGA License Agrmt. - 1 6 - 03/26V92 
error wiin regard to tne adm*.—on to or exclusion from the Building of any person. In case of invasion, mob, 
riot, public excitement, or other commotion, the City reserves the right to prevent access to the Building during 
the continuance of the same by closing of the doors or otherwise, for the safety of the tenants and protection of 
property in the Building and the Building. 
12. The City reserves the right to exclude or expel from the Building any person who, in the judgment of 
the City, is intoxicated or under the influence of Liquor or drugs, or who shall inAany manner do any act in 
violation of any of the rules and regulations of the Building. 
13. No vending machine or machines of any description shall be installed, maintained or operated upon the 
Premises without the written consent of the City. 
14. The City shall have the right, exercisable without notice and'without liability to the User, to change the 
name and street address of the Building of which the Premises are a part. 
15. The User shall not disturb, solicit, or canvass any occupants of the Building and shall cooperate to 
prevent same. 
16. The City shall have the right to control and operate the public portions of the Building, and the public 
facilities, and heating and air conditioning, as well as facilities furnished for the common use of the tenants, in 
such manner as it deems best for the benefit of the tenants generally. 
17. All entrance doors in the Premises shall be left locked when the Premises are not in use, and ail doors 
opening to public corridors shall be kept closed except for normal ingress and egress from the Premises. 
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FIRST ADDENDUM TO 
OFFICE USE AGREEMENT 
THIS FIRST ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE AGREEMENT is made this day of^ March 992 y 
„ , berweTn THE CITY OF NORTH SALT IAKE U T A B L a U t a h ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ S J ^ S ^ 
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH ^ % ^ ^ ^ O ^ ^ U u h non-profit 
corporation (the "Building Authority"), and UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATE, i r ^ , 
corporation ("User"). 
R E C I T A L S : 
K City and User entered into a certain OFFICE USE AGREEMENT of evendate herewith, 
wherein City agreed", construct and User agreed to use - H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e a t T e North Salt 
rPremises") which space shall be located in the Clubhouse (the Clubhouse I to be construe! 
L £ ^ Course (thT-Golf Course"), in the City of North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah. 
B. Building Authority is the fee title owner of a certain parcel of real F W g j ^ ^ 
Property") consisting of approximately 18,975 square feet ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ „
 attached hereto 
be located to the east of the proposed Clubhouse. The legal description of the UGA nope y 
as Exhibit "A". The UGA Property shall be zoned "Restricted Conditional Use. 
C As an inducement for User to enter into a use agreement City is ^ Z ^ t e M ™ 
no cost the exclusive use of 888 additional square feet of space in the lobby of the Clubhouse for the Utah 
Hall of'Fame, which area shall be open to the public during normal business hours. 
D . As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement, C i t y j wiUmg to gnmt to User 
exclusive use of the proposed golf course and use of golf carts for a total of two (2) * ^ ™ T ^ " 
year of L term of the use agreement for tournaments which are hosted and/or sponsored by User. 
E . As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement, ^ ^ " J ^ * 
User exclusive use of and access to the Golf Course Practice Drivmg Range for a total of two (2) hours pe 
week for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers program. 
F. As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement, ™ M * A ^ £ ^ > 
convey to User the UGA Property for the purpose of consttuctior, o f £ r t ^ ^ c S S T S Z terms and 
Golf Hall of Fame and executive offices said budding to be for Users ^ £ £ ^
 U s c r „ 
conditions hereinafter set forth. However, in the event User e l c c t s n ° l t0/^TV .
 w U l i n g t 0 ^ant said 
desirous of obtaining an Option to Extend the Agreement Term. Building Authonty is willing gr 
Option based upon the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set f o r n i x . * * 
Agreement, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are 
acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
, HMTOFFAMF.UIHBY. During the term of this J ^ ^ ^ £ ? S o ^ 5 . 
exclusive use of 888 additional square feet of space in ^ < = ^ « ^ J ^ c ^ ^
 b u s i n e s s 
purpose of housing the Utah Golf Hall of Fame, which ™ * ^ ! » * £ „ £ « « k m of! the space in 
IZs. By this Agreement, User obtains merely the use of. **""££ "
 v d ^ a d d i t i o n a l spVce to User 
which the Utah Golf Hall of Fame will be located. City hereby agrees to provide sai 
free of charge for the entire term of occupancy by User. 
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Agreement or any extension ^../eof or in the event User has constructed the ^GA Facility on the UGA Property 
as set forth in Section 4, below, City hereby grants to User the exclusive access to and use of the golf course 
and of the golf carts for a total of two (2) ten-hour weekdays each year of the use term for tournaments which 
are hosted and/or sponsored by User. All green fees paid by tournament participants during said two weekdays 
shall be retained by User. In the event that the golf course is not tournament-ready as determined by both User 
and City, then it is hereby agreed that the two-day use of the golf course granted herein for the applicable year 
may be postponed and used in a subsequent year. 
3. EXCLUSIVE USE OF PRACTICE DRIVING RANGE. During the term of this Agreement or 
any extension thereof or in the event User has constructed the UGA Facility on the UGA Property as set forth in 
Section 4, below, City hereby grants to User exclusive access to and use of the Practice Driving Range for a 
total of two (2) hours per week for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers program. User shall 
retain all fees charged to participants in User's Junior Golfers program during said two hour period. 
4. BUILDING AUTHORITY TO CONVEY TO USER UGA PROPERTY FOR 
CONSTRUCTION OF UGA HEADQUARTERS AND UTAH GOLF HALL OF FAME If at any time after the 
fourth Agreement Year of this Agreement User elects to construct its permanent headquarters and the Utah Golf 
Hall of Fame on the UGA Property (collectively the "UGA Facility"), User shall deliver to Building Authority 
written notice thereof (the "Construction Notice"). The Construction Notice shall set forth the proposed 
occupancy date of the UGA Facility and shall be accompanied by a rendering and floor plan of the proposed 
UGA Facility. Upon review and approval of the final plans for the UGA Facility by the City of North Salt Lake 
and its staff, Building Authority shall cause the UGA Property to be conveyed, at no cost to User, by Special 
Warranty Deed to User. The conveyance of the UGA Property to User shall be subject to the following deed 
restrictions: (a) that in the event that User does not complete construction of the UGA Facility as approved, 
within twelve (12) months after conveyance of the UGA Property to User, title to the UGA Property shall revert 
to Building Authority; and (b) User shall maintain the UGA Golf Hall of Fame at the UGA Facility for at least 
ten (10) years after conveyance of the UGA Property to User or title to the UGA Property shall revert to 
Building Authority. It is hereby understood and agreed that User shall be solely responsible for the cost of the 
construction of improvements upon the UGA Property and that User shall diligently pursue completion of the 
construction of the UGA Facility as approved by Building Authority. User shall use its best efforts to ensure 
that the construction of the UGA Facility does not interfere with City's use of the Clubhouse. Upon occupancy 
of the UGA Facility by User this Agreement shall terminate. The use of the UGA Facility shall be limited to the 
Utah Golf Hall of Fame (which area shall be open to the public during normal business hours), headquarters of 
User, and executive offices, unless otherwise agreed to by the City of North Salt Lake. The UGA Facility may 
be a two-story structure, provided that User must provide on-site parking of one parking stall for every 250 
square feet of gross leasable space. 
5. USER TO HAVE RIGHT TQ SELL UGA PROPERTY. In the event that User elects not to 
construct the UGA Facility, User shall have the right to sell the Deeded Property and receive the proceeds from 
said sale only upon the following conditions: 
a. User shall enter into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement for the Premises with a provision for an 
annual three percent (3%) increase in the base user fee for the extended term; and 
Building Authority shall have a right of first refusal to buy the right to use the UGA Property from 
User. If User proposes to sell, assign, convey, or otherwise dispose of all or any part of his interest in 
the UGA Property, User shall first make a written offer to sell such interest in the UGA Property to the 
Building Authority on the same terms and conditions on which User proposes to sell, assign, convey or 
otherwise dispose of such interest. Such offer shall state the name of the proposed transferee and all the 
terms and conditions of the proposed transfer, including the price to the proposed transferee, and shall 
be accompanied by a copy of the offer from the proposed transferee. Building Authority shall have the 
right for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of the offer from User to elect to purchase all of the 
interest in the UGA Property offered. To exercise its right to purchase, the Building Authority shall 
give written notice to User. Upon exercise of a right to purchase and, provided the right is exercised 
with respect to all of the interests in the UGA Property offered, the purchase shall be closed and 
payment made on the same terms as set forth in the offer received by User from the proposed 
transferee. If the Building Authority does not elect to purchase all of the interest in the UGA Property 
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c. 
the UGA Property u • \ e r and User may transfer the offered inters. *i the UGA Property to the 
proposed transferee named in the offer to the Building Authority. However, if that transfer is not made 
within ninety (90) days after the end of the ninety (90) day period provided for herein, a new offer shall 
be made to the Building Authority and the provisions of this Right of First Refusal shall again apply. 
To preserve the architectural design and intent of the golf course clubhouse and the development in the 
immediate area of the clubhouse City shall have the right to approve the development and architectural 
plans of the third party buyer with respect to the UGA Property. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this FIRST ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE 
AGREEMENT on the date first above written. 
City: 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
a Utah municipal corporation 
By: Km^rPPPTteZs 
User: 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC. 
a Utah non-profit non-p/6fit corporation 
By: ml &W*£**,J 
(Print Name) (Print Name) 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, 
a Utah non-profit corporation 
By: 
J). l0. ^trtAlfir/*? 
(print name) 
IK Tt£$lI)ENr~ 
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SECOND ADDENDUM TO 
OFFICE USE AGREEMENT 
THIS SECOND ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE AGREEMENT is made this 3rd day 
of January, 1994, by and between THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, a Utah 
municipal corporation (the "City"), THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation (the "Building 
Authority"), and UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah'non-profit corporation ("User"). 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. City and User entered into a certain OFFICE USE AGREEMENT and FIRST 
ADDENDUM TO OFFICE USE AGREEMENT on or about March 31, 1992, wherein City 
agreed to construct and User agreed to use approximately 2,424 square feet of office space 
("Premises"), which space was to have been located in the Clubhouse (the "Clubhouse") to be 
constructed at the North Salt Lake Golf Course (the "Golf Course"), in the City of North Salt 
Lake, Davis County, Utah. 
B. City and User desire to amend their prior agreements so as to provide that the 
City construct and User shall pay for the use of approximately £T7TsquarNiBet of office space 
("Premises"), rather than the 2,424 square feet originally contemplated, which space shall be 
located in the Clubhouse (the "Clubhouse") to be constructed at the North Salt Lake Golf Course 
(the "Golf Course"), in the City of North Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah. 
C. Building Authority is the fee title owner of a certain parcel of real property (the 
"UGA Property") consisting of approximately 18,975 square feet (size of lot = 115' x 165') 
which UGA Property shall be located to the-eSsT^f the proposed Clubhouse. The legal 
description of the UGA Property is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The UGA Property shall 
be zoned "Restricted Conditional Use." 
D. Due to unforeseeable circumstances, certain uses and rentable areas contemplated 
in the original agreement between the parties have necessarily been adjusted so as to be 





 C l t y imt i a l Iy agreed to provide to User, at no cost, the exclusive use of 888 
additional square feet of space in the lobby of the Clubhouse for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame, 
which area was required to be open to the public during normal business hours. However, the 
parties have agreed to amend their prior agreement so as to require the City to provide to User, 
at no cost, the use of 7-10 square feet in the lobby of the Clubhouse for Utah Golf Hall of Fame. 
UGA Use Agreemenl 
M«y6, 1994 * 
This area shall be open to the public during normal business hours. 
F. As an inducement for User to consent to the amendmentsrequjxed herein *eOty 
shall maie available to User a minimum ^ ^ d i d o n a l square feet of storage space access 
in the basement of the Clubhouse. 
0 . City is .OUn, to
 granUo *«<££>£££% ^ £ £ £ ° 3 £ « 
derived from the rental of said golf carts during such tournaments. 
H As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement. City h; wming 
to provS'e to User exclusive use of and access to the Golf Course Practice Dnvjng Range for 
T t o S ofUo (2) hours per week for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers 
p ™ ^ relenue generated from said Golf Course Practice Dnving Range for those two 
(2) hours per week shall be shared by the User and the City 50/5U. 
I As a further inducement for User to enter into a use agreement, Building 
Authority agrees to convey to User the UGA Property for the purpose of c o n * ^ f ° ^ U * e r * 
™ £ hlaoTuarters, the Utah Golf Hall of Fame and executive offices. Said building;Kbe 
f o u r ' s sde use, in accordance with the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. However 
£ the^venaJser e ects not to construct a new building, User is desirous of o ^ n m g an Opuon 
To Stend tne Agreement Term. Building Authority is willing to grant said Option based upon 
the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set.forth 
in this Agreement, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows. 
1 AMFNDMFNT TO TTSFB FRF. AND r ATF. CHARGES. The parties agree that 
p a r a g r a P h 4 of ^OFFICE USE AGREEMENT d a ^ T t o c h l H * * shall be amended to 
read as follows: 
User a»r=es to pay to City, without prior n o t e or demand, the sum of T W E N " " ^ ? 
raOUSA^D AND ™ DOLLARS W W M V * ^ . ^ ^ * * ^ , 
installments of TWO THOUSAND EIGHTY-THREE AND 34/100 ($2,083 34) per mo 
whfch monthly installment is due on or before the first day o « h ~ n t h * e term 
hereof The user fee for any period during the term hereof which is for less than one u ; 
S t prora ted portiJof die monthly installment herein ta*g> ***% W H £ 
month. The user fee shall be paid to City, withou <s*^*0£%IZ%^at the time 
herein, in lawful money of the United States of America, ^ ^ ^ ^ * Qty may 
of payment at the office of the City or to, ^ o * = r ^ " J ^ a t h / ayment by User 
from time to time designate in writing. User hereby acicnowicugw
 v 
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to City of user fees or other sums due hereunder will cause City to incur costs not contemplated 
by this Agreement, the exact amount of which will be extremely difficult to ascertain. Such 
costs include, but are not limited to, processing and accounting charges, and late charges which 
may be imposed upon City by terms of any mortgage or trust deed covering the Premises. 
Accordingly, if any user fee payment or a sum due from User shall not be received by City or 
City's designee within TEN (10) days of the due date thereof, User shall pay to City a late 
charge equal to ten percent (10%) of such overdue amount. The parties hereby agree that such 
late charges represent a fair and reasonable estimate of the cost that City will incur by reason 
of the late payment by User. Acceptance of such late charges by the City shall in no event 
constitute a waiver of User's default with respect to such overdue amount, nor prevent City from 
exercising any of the other rights and remedies granted hereunder. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, in the event that, after receiving reasonable notice from User, the City fails to: (a) 
provide services, utilities, maintenance, and repairs as required under this Agreement; or (b) 
diligently pursue and prosecute its obligations under this Agreement, User hereby reserves the 
right to place the monthly user fee due under this Agreement in an interest bearing escrow 
account until the City has resolved or is diligently pursuing a resolution of the problem. 
2. HALL OF FAME LOBBY During the term of the Office Use Agreement, City 
hereby grants to User the exclusive use of 710 additional square feet of space in the Clubhouse 
at the North Salt Lake Golf Course for the purpose of housing the Utah Golf Hall of Fame, 
which area shall be open to the public during normal business hours. By this Agreement, User 
obtains merely the use of, but no interest in or possession of, the space in which the Utah Golf 
Hall of Fame will be located. City hereby agrees to provide said additional space to User free 
of charge for the entire term of occupancy by User, 
3. EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TD GOLF COURSE FOR TOURNAMENTS. During 
the term of this Agreement or any extension thereof or in the event User has constructed the 
UGA Facility on the UGA Property as set forth in Section 6, below, City hereby grants to User 
the exclusive access to use the golf course and of the golf carts for a total of two (2) ten-hour 
weekdays each year of the use term for tournaments which are hosted and/or sponsored by User. 
All green (ees paid by tournament participants during said two said weekdays, shall be retained 
by User; User and City shall share 50/50 any revenue generated from the use of golf carts; 
however, any revenue generated from the use of rental clubs, and other concessions at the golf 
course, shall be paid to the City. 
4
- EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TQ PRACTICE DRIVING RANGE. During the term 
of this Agreement or any extension thereof or in the event User has constructed the UGA 
Facility on the UGA Property as set forth in Section 6, below, City hereby grants to User 
exclusive access to and use of the Practice Driving Range for a total of two (2) hours per week 
for training purposes in conjunction with its Junior Golfers program. User and City shall share 
50/50 all revenues generated from range balls charged to participants in User's Junior Golfers 
program during said two hour period on the Practice Driving Range. 
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5- EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TO STORAGE SPACE IN CLUBHOUSE. During the 
term of this Agreement or any extension thereof, and provided that the User is still leasing the 
2,178 square feet of office space in the Clubhouse, City hereby grants to User exclusive access 
to a minimum of 125 square feet of storage space in the Clubhouse basement. Said storage area 
shall be designated by the City for the exclusive use and benefit of the User at no additional 
cost. 
6. BUTLDrNG AUTHORITY TO rO^^VEY TO USER UGA PROPERTY FOR 
CONSTRUCTION OF UGA HEADQUARTERS AND UTAH GOLF HALL OF FAME. If 
at any time after the fourth Agreement Year of this Agreement User elects to construct its 
permanept headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the UGA Property (collectively the 
"UGA Facility"), User shall deliver to Building Authority written notice thereof (the 
"Construction No dee"). The Construction Notice shall set forth the \proposed occupancy date 
of the UGA Facility and shall be accompanied by a rendering and floor plan of the proposed 
UGA Facility. Upon review and approval of the final plans for the UGA Facility by the City 
of North Salt Lake and its staff, Building Authority shall cause the UGA Property to be 
conveyed, at no cost to User, by Special Warranty Deed to User. The conveyance of the UGA 
Property to User shall be subject to the following deed restrictions: (a) that in the event that 
User does not complete construction of the UGA Facility as approved, within twelve (12) 
months after conveyance of the UGA Property to User, title to the UGA Property shall revert 
to Building Authority; and (b) User shall maintain the UGA Golf Hall of Fame at the UGA 
Facility for at least ten (10) years after conveyance of the UGA Property to Useror title to the 
UGA Property shall revert to Building Authority. It is hereby understood and agreed that User 
shall be solely responsible for the cost of the construction of improvements upon the UGA 
Property and that User shall diligently pursue completion of the construction of the UGA Facility 
as approved by Building Authority. User shall use its best efforts to ensure that the construction 
of the UGA Facility does not interfere with City's use of the Clubhouse. Upon occupancy of 
the UGA Facility by User, this Agreement shall terminate. The use of the UGA Facility shall 
be limited to the Utah Golf Hall of Fame (which area shall be open to the public during normal 
business hours), headquarters of User, and executive offices, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
City of NQrth Salt Lake. The UGA Facility may be a two-story structure, provided that User 
must provide on-site parking of one parking stall for every 250 square feet of gross leasable 
space. 
7. USER TO HAVE RIGHT TO SELL UGA PROPERTY. In the event that User 
elects not to construct the UGA Facility, User shall have the right to sell the Deeded Property 
and receive the proceeds from said sale only upon the following conditions: 
a. User shall enter into a long-term (twenty years) use agreement for the Premises 
upon such terms and conditions agreed upon between the parties on or before the 
expiration of the original five (5) year Agreement Term set forth in paragraph 
3(a) of the March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement; and 
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Building Authority shall have a right of first refusal to buy the right to use the 
UGA Property from User. If User proposes to sell, assign, convey, or otherwise 
dispose of all or any part of his interest in the UGA Property, User shall first 
make a written offer to sell such interest in the UGA Property to the Building 
Authority on the same terms and conditions on which User proposes to sell" 
assign, convey or otherwise dispose of such interest. Such offer shall state the 
name of the proposed transferee and all terms and conditions of the proposed 
transfer, including the price to the proposed transferee, and shall be accompanied 
by a copy of the offer from the proposed transferee. Building Authority shall 
have the right for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of the offer from User 
to elect to purchase all of the interest in the UGA Property offered. To exercise 
of a right to purchase and, provided the right is exercised with respect to all of 
the interests in the UGA Property offered, the purchase shall be closed and 
payment made on the same terms as set forth in the offer received by User from 
the proposed transferee. If the Building Authority does not elect to purchase all 
of the interest in the UGA Property offered in accordance with the provisions of 
this Right of First Refusal, Building Authority shall convey the UGA Property to 
User and User may transfer the offered interest in the UGA Property to the 
proposed transferee named in the offer to the Building Authority. However, if 
that transfer is not made within ninety (90) days after the end of the ninety (90) 
day period provided for herein, a new offer shall be made to the Building 
Authority and the provisions of this Right of First Refusal shall again apply. 
To preserve the architectural design and intent of the golf course clubhouse and 
the development m the immediate area of the Clubhouse, City shall have the right 
to approve the development and architectural plans of the third party buyer with 
respect to the UGA Property. 
UGA U« Agreement 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this SECOND ADDENDUM TO 
OFFICE USE AGREEMENT on the date first above written. 
City: 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH 
a Utah municipal corporation 
By: 
its 
OLASZB A • JONES 
(Print Name) 
User: 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC. 
a Utah non-profit non-profit corporation 
By: M e >/$&* 
*\ In?h Ph\^n u 
(Print Name) 
£_J&d£/WJ 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, 
a Utah non-profit corporation 
By: A^, 
Qjmz A- Jones 
(Print Name) 
' ty.-N=>Wu/ W QudLre^— 
6 
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Doug Baxter, President 
lee Samsel, Vice President 
jeanme Coddard Secretary 
Robert "Bud" Paul, Treasurer 
Arlen Peacock, Director 
Tonv Bermingham, Director 
Mike Dmitnch, Director 
Clea Rasmussen, Director 
Paul Hatch, Director 
Parley Petersen, Director 
Mike jorgensen Director 
Dick Wood, Director 
Executive Director 
Joe Watts 
Mayor Jim Dixon 
North Salt Lake 
North Salt Lake, Utah 
Dear Mayor Dixon: 
We have decided that the major obstacle in the negotiation of a new lease is the 
difference of opinion we share on the value of the lot. 
We have been negotiating a price on the lot out of a consideration and courtesy to North 
Salt Lake. We have been offering you a chance to buy the lot from us so that you 
wouldn't have to go to the extra expense of clearing the developer's lien. Because we 
have been unable to agree on a value of the lot we have decided to abide by the original 
agreement. 
We will agree to sign a 20-year lease at $32,000 per year, with reasonable increases 
based on an agreeable Consumer Price Index to be reviewed every five years. Other 
terms of our present lease would stay in place. 
This offer is made on the basis that we will be given clear deed to the property as per our 
original agreement. It should be understood that we will not accept the deed with the 
restrictions that have been placed on it by the developer. 
Please get back to us as soon as possible. We are anxious to resolve this matter. If your 
side has the perception that we have been trying to delay this process your perception is 
entirely in error. The delay in negotiating has been caused by our willingness to give you 
a fair opportunity to purchase the lot and to keep it under your control without you having 








1110 East Eaglewood Drive 
North Salt Lake, UT 84054 




CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE 
20 South Hwy.89 P.O. Box 540208 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054-0208 
(801)298-3877 
December 9, 1999 
JAMES W. DDCON 
Mayor 
COLLIN H. WOOD 
City Manager 
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT 
Douglas A. Baxter 
President 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION 
1110 East Eaglewood Drive 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
RE: Utah Golf Association Lease 
Dear Mr. Baxter: 
The Mayor and City Council considered the status of the UGA's lease at the Eaglewood 
Golf Course during their council meeting last Tuesday evening. Since the expiration of your 
lease for office space at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse in January of 
this year, the City has attempted to negotiate the terms of a new long-term lease consistent with 
the provisions of paragraph 7(a) of the Second Addendum to the Office Use Agreement. Those 
efforts have unfortunately been unsuccessful. It does not appear that the Utah Golf Association 
and the City will be able to reach mutually agreeable terms for the continuation of the UGA as 
a tenant at the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse. 
In addition, it has been represented to the City that the UGA does not wish to construct 
the UGA facility on the property adjacent to the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse. Please be 
advised that if it is the UGA's intent to construct its permanent facility on the lot adjacent to the 
Eaglewood Clubhouse, written notice to that effect must be delivered to the City within thirty 
(30) days from the date of this letter and the enclosed notice of termination of your lease 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Second Addendum to the Office Use Agreement. 
In closing, let me state that the City has appreciated its association with the UGA, an 
association which has been positive for the past five plus years. Unfortunately, the economics 
Douglas A. Baxter 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION 
December 9, 1999 
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related to an ongoing Lessor-Lessee situation for both parties are apparently not feasible. 
Sincerely, 
CITY 0 ^ t o * T & skLT LAKE 
KLC/moc 




NOTICE TO QUIT AND 
TERMINATION OF MONTH-TO-MONTH LEASE 
TO THE UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah non-profit corporation, 1110 East 
Eaglewood Drive, North Salt Lake, Utah, TENANTS IN POSSESSION. 
You are hereby notified that the month-to-month lease on the above premises shall 
terminate effective December 31, 1999, and you shall be required to deliver up possession of 
the premises to the Lessor or its duly authorized managing agent no later than 12:00 midnight, 
December 31, 1999. 
Said premises are known as Eaglewood Golf Course Club House, 1110 East Eaglewood 
Drive, North Salt Lake, Utah. In the event of your failure to vacate said premises by December 
31, 1999, you'will be unlawfully be detaining possession of said premises, and in accordance 
with the provision's of Section 78-36-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, you will be liable for treble 
damages for such unlawful detainer, and action will be commenced against you to evict you 
from said premises and to take judgment against you for the rent accrued and for three times the 
damages assessed by the court for unlawful detainer, together with the costs of legal action. 
This notice is given and served in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-36-3 and 
-1-
Section 78-36-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
DATED this ^ J j ! day of December, 1999. 
CITY OF N< 
Served by Personal Service: 
Service date: /*? ~/O ~-<?'? By /VJSsz^// AJc^o r^~\ 
Title: £'C " -{-£**#« -f~ /(JS£/><£> Served by: 
Signature 
Served by Posting on Premises: 
Served on: 
Served by: Title: 
Signature 
Served by Mail: 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing notice via certified mail to Doug Baxter, President, 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, 1110 East Eaglewood Drive,/lorthjSalt Lake, Utah 84054, this 
*day of December, 1999. 
KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN of 
CHRISTIANSEN & CHRISTIANSEN 
P.O. Box 11751 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., 




THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, ] 
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; ; 
and THE CITY OF NORTH SALT ] 
LAKE, UTAH, MUNICIPAL ] 
BUILDING AUTHORITY, a Utah non- ; 
profit corporation, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
) TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 000900561 
) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
DAVIS COUNTY ) 
James W. Dixon, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit. All statements 
hereinafter set forth within this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal and direct 
Third Judicial Disstct 
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Clubhouse whereupon the UG A permanent headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame would 
be constructed. (The subject property is hereinafter referred to as the "UGA Property"). After 
construction, the use of the UGA facility was to be limited to the Utah Golf Hall of Fame and 
the UGA headquarters. (See First and Second Addenda to Office Use Agreement at paragraph 
6). 
7. In the event that the UGA elected not to construct its permanent headquarters and 
the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the subject property, the UGA would have been permitted to sell 
the property upon the condition that (a) the UGA enter into a long-term (twenty year) use 
agreement at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse upon such terms and 
conditions agreed upon between the parties on or before the expiration of the original five (5) 
year Agreement Term; and (b) that the City shall have first right of refusal to buy the UGA 
property; and (c) the City reserved the right to approve all development and architectural plans 
for any use on the subject property. (See First and Second Addenda to Office Use Agreement 
at paragraph 7). 
8. The City believed title to the subject property had been deeded to the City at the 
time the City originally acquired the Eaglewood Golf Course from its developer. The actual 
conveyance of the subject property to the City occurred on or about September 19, 1997. See 
Special Warranty Deed. 
9. Fee title to the subject lot was conveyed to the City at that time by Special 
Warranty Deed subject to the easements and rights of way of record and a use restriction that 
the property be used only for a golf course or as an office for the Utah Golf Association (the 
"UGA"). 
3 
10. The original five (5) year Agreement Lease Term expired and the UGA failed to 
either exercise its option to build its permanent headquarters on the subject property; or to enter 
long-term (twenty year) lease at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse. 
into a 
basis. 
11. The UGA thereafter continued to rent space at the clubhouse on a month-to-month 
12. After the original Lease Agreement had expired, the City and the UGA made 
numerous unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement for a new lease at the Eaglewood Golf 
Course Clubhouse. 
13. On or about December 9, 1999, the City terminated the month-to-month lease 
with the UGA by providing the UGA with proper written notice. The UGA vacated the 
premises on or about December 31, 1999 and moved their offices to another location in Salt 
Lake County. 
FURTHER THY AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 




On this l k _ day of May, 2000, personally appeared before me James W. Dixon, the 




c NOTARY PUBLIC 
n t x p i ^ T E 0 F U T A H 
My Commission Expires 
July 7 2001 
TIFFIN! JOHN 
140 West 9000 South 
Sandy Utah 84070 
NOTARY PUBLIC] 
Residing at: V 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 14 2000 
By. 
M-T LAKE CO 
M 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., 
a Utah non-profit corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal 
corporation; and THE CITY OF 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, i 
Utah non-profit corporation, 
Defendants• 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 000900561 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
plaintiff seeking a ruling on its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, 
the Court rules as stated herein. 
In its Motion, the plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the 
issue of liability for breach of contract. On March 13, 1992, the 
parties entered into an Office Use Agreement. Two Addendums were 
subsequently executed by the parties. The First Addendum recites 
that as inducement for the plaintiff to enter into the Use 
Agreement, the defendant City of North Salt Lake, Utah, Building 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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Authority ("Building Authority11), agrees to convey a parcel of real 
property (referred to in the First Addendum as the MUGA property") 
to the plaintiff "for the purpose of construction of [its] 
corporate headquarters, the Utah Golf Hall of Fame and executive 
offices . . . " (First Addendum at para. F). The First Addendum 
at paragraph B states that the Building Authority "is the fee title 
owner" of the UGA property. 
The plaintiff's position, as supported by the Affidavit of Joe 
Watts, the plaintiff's executive director, is that the defendants 
breached the Use Agreement because the Building Authority did not 
originally have fee title to the UGA property. Moreover, when the 
defendants finally acquired title to the property by Special 
Warranty Deed, the plaintiff contends that the deed restrictions 
and a reduced lot size compromised the value of the property. 
The defendants focus not on their ability to convey fee title 
to the plaintiff, but the conditions precedent to such a 
conveyance. The defendants assert that under the Use Agreement, 
together with the Addendums, if the plaintiff elected not to 
construct on the UGA property, one of the conditions precedent to 
the plaintiff acquiring the property would have been for it to 
enter into a twenty-year lease upon mutually agreeable terms. The 
defendants1 position is that since the parties were not able to 
reach an agreement with respect to the terms of this twenty-year 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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lease, the plaintiff never acquired any right to conveyance of the 
property. 
It is well-settled that under certain circumstances, the 
effect of an anticipatory breach discharges any remaining duties, 
including the performance of conditions precedent, of the injured 
party. See County of Solano v. Valleio Redevelopment Agency, 75 
Cal. App. 4th 1262 (Ca. App. 1999) ; E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts, 
Second Edition §8.20 (1990). Therefore, the threshold issue is 
whether the defendants1 ability to transfer to the plaintiffs the 
UGA property subject to easements and rights of way of record and 
a use restriction constitutes an anticipatory breach which excused 
the plaintiff's performance of the conditions precedent set forth 
in the Addenda. To answer this question, the Court must first 
ascertain whether the Building Authority's agreement to convey the 
UGA property, which it represented to own as "the fee title owner", 
contemplated the conveyance of an unencumbered, unrestricted title 
to the plaintiff. 
The Court determines that in giving the plaintiff the option 
to sell the UGA property to a third party, the parties clearly 
intended that the defendants would convey title which would not 
restrict the possibility of such a sale. However, it is 
undisputed that the restriction appearing in the Special Warranty 
deed did preclude this possibility because it required that the lot 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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be used only for an addition to the City's golf course or as the 
plaintifffs headquarters. As the plaintiff points out, because of 
this restriction, the UGA property could not be sold to anyone 
other than the City or the plaintiff. Since the defendants were 
unable to lift this restriction, their inability to perform at 
least some of the obligations under the parties1 Agreement 
constitutes an anticipatory breach. 
As stated previously, an anticipatory breach will generally 
excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition precedent. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts §255 (1977). See also 17 CJS Contracts 
§471(1) (A party's anticipatory breach may excuse the other 
party's performance, even of conditions precedent to performance 
by the breaching party) ; J. Murray, Murray on Contracts §188 at p. 
366-67 (If, when the time for the happening of a condition 
precedent arrives, it appears that the promise that is qualified 
by the condition cannot be performed by the promisor, the general 
rule is that the condition is excused . . . . If it is reasonably 
certain that the promisee will not receive that which is the 
contemplated exchange for the performance of the condition, there 
is every reason why he should not be required to perform the 
condition as a preliminary to the recovery of compensation for 
defeated expectations . . . . ) . However, the rule excusing the 
non-occurrence of conditions precedent does not apply "[w]hen the 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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promisee could not, or would not, have performed the condition in 
any event [i.e., whether or not the promisor repudiated] • . . .w 
Id. : Comment a to Section 255 of the Restatement; 4 A. Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts § 978 at p. 924 (1951) . For example, in 
Ufitec. S.A. v. Trade Bank & Trust Co., 249 N.Y.2d 557, 560 (N.Y. 
1964), the court stated, "an anticipatory breach, in a proper case, 
may excuse one for performing a useless act, but it does not excuse 
one from the obligation of proving readiness, willingness, and 
ability to have performed the conditions precedent." 
Therefore, the next issue is whether the plaintiff could have 
performed the conditions in any event. Since it was not possible 
for the plaintiff to sell the property to a third-party, the 
condition concerning right to approve the development and 
architectural plans of a third-party buyer is not applicable. The 
same can be said of the condition of right of first refusal. 
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the 20-year 
lease provision of the Second Addendum is an unenforceable 
"agreement to agree". Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 
558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976). Therefore, the 20-year lease 
provision of the First Addendum is controlling. The plaintiff's 
December 8, 1999, letter to the defendants evidences the 
plaintiff's readiness and willingness to enter into the required 
20-year lease for more rent than required by the First Addendum. 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
OF NORTH SALT LAKE PAGE 6 MINUTE ENTRY 
Accordingly, the plaintiff has demonstrated that it could have 
perrormeatne 20-year lease condition if the defendants had not 
first breached the Agreement• The Court therefore concludes that 
the defendants• anticipatory breach excused the plaintifffs 
performance of the conditions precedent. The plaintifff s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore granted/ 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Minute Entry decision and submit the same to the Court 
for review and signature• / 
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) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMAR Y 
) JUDGMENT AND RECONSIDERATION 
) Civil No. 000900561 
) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants, The City of North Salt Lalce, Utah and The City of North Salt Lalce, 
Utah Municipal Building Authority (collectively the "City"), respectfully move the Court for an 
order granting summary judgment in their favor. The grounds are that the agreement to transfer 
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1 / SALT LAKE COUNTY 
the building lot to plaintiff, as interpreted by the Court, is ultra vires and unenforceable under 
Utah law. No consideration at all was offered, given, or required by plaintiff for the 
lot—essentially it was to be a gift from the City for plaintiff agreeing to office at the Eaglewood 
Golf Course clubhouse. Utah law requires that a city receive in exchange for city property 
present value that reflects fair market value. The City was to receive no value, let alone fair 
market value for the lot and, as such, the agreement is ultra vires and void. 
The City also asks that the Court reconsider its ruling on plaintiffs motion for 
partial summary judgment. Neither the parties nor the Court considered the effect of the general 
rule applicable in land sales that a seller is not required to have title to real property until the time 
arrives for closing of the sale. A question of fact exists whether the alleged defect in title in this 
case could have been remedied. This issue was never explored, discussed, or argued by the 
parties. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum and affidavits in support filed 
contemporaneously. 
DATED this _Qday of January, 2001. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Mary Anne WOOCK 
Larry S. Jenkins 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Jf|_ day of January, 2001,1 caused to be mailed in the 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Reconsideration, to the following: 
Lester A. Perry, Esq. 
Kessler & Rust 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^ $ ^ 
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20. The First Addendum and Second Addendum both provide that if plaintiff 
elected to enter into a twenty-year use agreement and sell the Lot, the City would have a right of 
first refusal on the Lot. First Addendum <j 5; Second Addendum 11 7. 
21. The City obtained title to the Lot in 1997 from one of the developers of the 
golf course and surrounding subdivision, but the special warranty deed transferring the Lot to the 
City contained deed restrictions that allowed it to be used only for construction of plaintiff s 
headquarters or for other golf course purposes. Amended Complaint f^ 29. 
22. Neither plaintiff nor the City approached the developer to ascertain 
whether the deed restrictions could be released. Affidavit of Mary Wood Cannon ("Cannon 
Aff.")1f 5, Exhibit E. 
23. In fact, the developer is and was willing to release the deed restrictions if 
the City would have agreed to exercise its right of first refusal. Cannon Aff. f 6. 
24. This Court ruled that plaintiff was excused from entering into a 
twenty-year use agreement with the City because the City was in anticipatory repudiation of the 
agreement between the parties. The Court found that the City was in breach because it did not 
have unrestricted title to the Lot. Minute Entry at 3-6. 
25. Following the Court's ruling, plaintiff believes it is entitled to receive the 
fair market value of the Lot as one element of its damages, and plaintiff claims that value is 
$190,000. Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 4, and Exhibit F, 
vii 
which is a copy of the summary of the Christensen appraisal referred to in the interrogatory 
answer. 
26. The City has obtained tenants for about 1450 square feet of the space 
formerly used by plaintiff. The City has taken over the rest of the space used by plaintiff, 
including the space used for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame. Seven hundred square feet of the space 
formerly used by plaintiff is now leased for $14.50 per square foot and 750 square feet is leased 
at $10.00 per square foot, for an average rate of $12.17 per square feet. Affidavit of L. Scott 
Gardner1 ("Gardner Aff.") (Exhibit G) <fi| 3-4. 
27. Those using the space under the agreements referenced in the preceding 
paragraph are not allowed exclusive use of the golf course and they are not allowed to keep green 
fees or golf cart rentals as plaintiff was allowed under the Second Addendum. Gardner Aff. *[ 5. 
LFiled herewith is a facsimile copy of the Gardner Affidavit. The original will be 
filed with the court as soon as counsel receives it. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGREEMENT TO TRANSFER THE BUILDING LOT IS ULTRA 
VIRES AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
A. Actions to Give Away Public Property are Ultra Vires In Utah. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a municipality holds its property "in 
trust for the use and benefit of its inhabitants and [such property] cannot be disposed of by gift 
without specific legislative authority." Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975). To 
avoid being an illegal gift, a transfer of municipal property must be made 'in good faith and for 
an adequate consideration." Id. "Adequate consideration" is defined as a "present benefit that 
reflects the fair market value" of the property transferred. Municipal Bldg. Authority of Iron 
County v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). As such, the consideration 
cannot be speculative or provide a future benefit. Id. It must be real present benefit. The Court 
must be able to specify "exactly what [the] benefit is. in present market value terms," and a 
"general finding" of some benefit is not sufficient. Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney , 1999 UT 73, % 32, 985 P.2d 899, 910 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added). 
In Sears, Ogden City wanted to vacate a street and give the land to the Board of 
Education of Ogden City. The street divided the campus of Ogden High School. The Supreme 
Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2, which allows a city to "dispose" of its property, did 
not allow disposal by gift, but only for "adequate consideration." 533 P.2d at 119. The 
substance of that statute has not changed since Sears was decided. 
1 
In Lowder, the county wanted to transfer an old jail and its site to the county's 
building authority for a nominal sum as part of an agreement that would provide for a new jail 
for the county and transfer the site back to the county in twenty years. Even though a public 
benefit could be seen in the transfer, the Supreme Court disallowed the transfer because the 
county would not receive "present benefit that reflects the fair market value" of the property 
transferred. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. The Court said the benefit "is a speculative and future 
benefit that cannot suffice to validate a present transfer of the fee." Id. 
In Salt Lake County Comm fn, the Supreme Court ruled that contributions to 
certain charities by Salt Lake County were illegal even though the district court had found they 
provided the County a benefit. The district court believed "'[e]ach of the payments is intended to 
achieve a specific result' and that the result 'is a benefit to the County, the value of which may 
well exceed the sum expended, perhaps by a substantial amount.'" 1999 UT at % 32, 985 P.2d 
at 910. The Supreme Court invalidated the transfers, however, because the contributions "were 
not tied to any specific services to be rendered," and the county failed to provide "a detailed 
showing of the benefits to be obtained from the money given." Id. 
It is critical that the Court see from these cases that the kind of consideration 
required for the transfer of public property is not just the typical "bargained for exchange" 
required in contracts generally. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 and comment c 
(consideration can be mixture of bargain and gift and courts generally will not scrutinize gift 
part). The consideration required for public property must be real and substantial. It must be 
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"present benefit that reflects fair market value." Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. When the transfer is 
for nominal, speculative, future, or no consideration, the transfer is illegal. Moreover, the Court 
is charged with specifying "exactly what [the] benefit is, in present market value terms." Salt 
Lake County Comm 7?, 1999 UT 73, f 32, 985 P.2d at 910 (emphasis added). 
B. The Agreement of the Parties Provided No Consideration for the Lot. 
When the First Addendum and Second Addendum are examined, it is clear that 
while there was consideration for the use of the office space at the clubhouse by plaintiff, there 
was no consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n 
provided for the Lot. And, while the one condition precedent for plaintiff to be able to keep the 
proceeds from the sale of the Lot was to enter into a twenty-year use agreement for the office 
space, this Court has ruled what the amount was plaintiff had to pay for the twenty-year 
agreement that never happened, and this amount likely is below market for just the use of the 
office space. Thus, it cannot be argued that the twenty-year use agreement was to be 
consideration for the Lot. The agreement to allow plaintiff to keep the proceeds from the sale of 
the Lot is ultra vires because it completely lacks the type of consideration required by Sears, 
Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n. 
The Court held that the user fee for the twenty-year use agreement would have 
been three percent above the base fee paid under the Office Use Agreement, with the amount 
going up three percent annually. Minute Entry at 5. That means, plaintiff would have had to pay 
$25,750 the first year, and so forth, because the base rate set forth in the Second Addendum is 
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$25,000 per year. Second Addendum If 1. The Court, however, also ruled that plaintiff was not 
required to enter into a twenty-year use agreement to get the Lot because the City did not have 
unrestricted title to the Lot. Minute Entry at 3-5. 
Assuming a twenty-year use agreement had been executed at $25,750 per year for 
2178 square feet that would be $11.82 per square feet. Yet, the City also allowed plaintiff to use 
another 710 square feet at no charge for the Utah Golf Hall of Fame. Under the principles of 
Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n, the City could not legally allow the use of its 
space for free, so that area should also be taken into consideration when determining the square 
foot rate plaintiff would have been obligated to pay. That makes the total space used at 2,888 
square feet, or $8.92 per square foot if the user fee were $25,750. 
Each year, plaintiff was also allowed exclusive use of the golf course for two days 
and was allowed to keep the green fees and 50 percent of the golf cart rentals for those days. 
Plaintiff received an average of $5,532 per year over the course of the Office Use Agreement in 
green fees and golf cart rentals, thereby effectively further lowering the user fee plaintiff paid. 
Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 7. Plaintiff believed that 
these provisions allowing for the exclusive use of the golf course and retention of green fees and 
golf cart rentals would continue in any twenty-year use agreement. Id, response to Interrogatory 
No. 10. 
When $5,500, therefore, is subtracted from the $25,750 user fee the Court ruled 
plaintiff would have had to pay, the effective user fee is about $20,250 per year or $9.30 per 
4 
square foot for 2,178 square feet and $7.01 per square feet for 2,888 square feet. The principles 
of Sears9 Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n again demand that these green fees and golf 
cart rentals fees be applied to reduce the user fee rate because these fees, absent the Second 
Addendum, otherwise belong to the City. 
Since plaintiff left the clubhouse, the City has leased 1,450 square feet of the 
space plaintiff used, and the City has taken over the rest of the space. The City receives an 
average of $12.17 per square foot for the space that is leased, and the renters are not allowed 
exclusive use of the golf course or to keep green fees and golf cart rentals. Gardner Aff. ffl[ 3-4. 
Thus, the amount plaintiff would have paid for a twenty-year use agreement would have been at 
or below market rate for the office space. 
The point is that plaintiff did not and would not have paid above a fair market 
value for the use of the office space. Thus, there is consideration for the twenty-year use 
agreement, yet the First Addendum and Second Addendum provided no additional consideration 
for the Lot. Apparently, the Lot was just a gift thrown in—like the Hall of Fame space and green 
fees—for plaintiff agreeing to office at the clubhouse. Because the City is prohibited by Utah 
law from giving away its property for less than a "present benefit that reflects the fair market 
value," the First Addendum and Second Addendum are ultra vires in that respect and cannot be 
enforced. This is the result whether plaintiff would have executed a twenty-year use agreement 
or not—the agreement to transfer the Lot or the proceeds from the sale of it was illegal. In other 
words, plaintiff has no damages and its claim must be dismissed. 
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C. The Court's Prior Ruling Enlarges and Makes Clear the Agreement's 
Violation of Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm'n. 
The Court's prior ruling on plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment 
enlarges and makes bare the violation of Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm *n created 
by the parties agreement. Under the Second Addendum, plaintiff paid $25,000 per year for the 
office space for six years, or about $150,000 total in user fees. Plaintiff, however, also received 
and retained $33,192 in green fees and golf cart rentals over the life of the Office Use 
Agreement. Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 7. Thus, 
plaintiff paid $116,808 net for the space over six years. As discussed above, this is likely below 
market rate for the office space. 
Now plaintiff wants the Court to order the City to pay it $190,000 just for the 
value of the Lot. Interrogatory Responses (Exhibit D), response to Interrogatory No. 4 and 
Exhibit F. (Plaintiff also claims other damages.) That is $73,192 more than the total amount 
plaintiff paid out over the life of the Office Use Agreement for just the use of the space. Plaintiff 
wants all of the money back that it paid, plus a nearly 63 percent return on the user fees it paid. 
The City is left with nothing if the Court accepts plaintiffs reasoning. It has to 
give back the money plaintiff paid for the six years plaintiff used the office space, plus a bunch 
more. After the Court's ruling, the City does not even have the twenty-year use agreement 
plaintiff was supposed to enter into to obtain the Lot, which would have brought in over $25,000 
each year for twenty years, or more than $500,000. It means the City will have paid out $73,192 
(plus possibly other damages plaintiff seeks) just for the privilege of having had plaintiff use the 
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City's office space for six years for free. The Court cannot condone this result because the City 
is prohibited by Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Comm 'n from leasing space at the 
clubhouse for free. Yet, that is what would happen. If nothing else, this justifies reopening the 
Court's ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment because of the loss to the City of the 
twenty-year use agreement. 
II. THE COURT'S PRIOR RULING FAILED TO CONSIDER 
CONTROLLING UTAH LAW. 
The Court ruled that plaintiff was excused from entering into a twenty-year use 
agreement with the City because the City did not have unrestricted title to the Lot. This finding, 
however, was premature. In fact, the City could have delivered unrestricted title to the Lot. 
Utah law is clear that a seller of real estate does not need to have unencumbered 
title to the property at all times during the executory period of the contract. Neves v. Wright, 638 
P.2d 1195, 1197-98 (Utah 1981). The seller is not required to have marketable title until the time 
for conveyance arrives. Woodardv. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 222, 265 P.2d 398, 399 (1953). As 
such, an anticipatory repudiation of an agreement to convey real estate cannot occur unless 
defects in the title cannot be remedied by the seller. See Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 
1125 (Utah 1984) ("encumbrances on appellants' title are irremediable"). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Neves stated that the "basic test" for determining 
whether defects are irremediable is "whether the defect, by its nature, is one that can be removed, 
as a practical matter, as distinguished from defects which, by their nature, cannot be removed by 
the seller as a practical matter." Neves, 638 P.2d at 1199. Further, "[a] defect which, by its 
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nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter is one ;of such a nature that the 
vendor neither has title "nor in a practical sense any prospect of acquiring it.'"" Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Neither party in this case attempted to determine whether the restrictions on the 
Lot could be released. In fact, those restrictions could have been removed. Cannon Aff. ^[ 5-6. 
The developer would have released the restrictions if the City agreed to exercise its right of first 
refusal to purchase the Lot. Id. One might ask how this would change the outcome. It would 
mean that the City could have delivered and plaintiff would have been required to enter into the 
twenty-year use agreement to get the proceeds from the sale of the Lot. Further, plaintiff would 
not be able to claim the huge windfall it now seeks. 
An issue of fact exists whether, as a practical matter, the restrictions on the deed 
could have been removed had plaintiff agreed to a twenty-year use agreement and the time for 
conveyance arrived. The Court should, therefore, reconsider its ruling granting plaintiff partial 
summary judgment on this issue, and it should find that this issue of whether a breach occurred 
should go to trial. 
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LESTER A. PERRY (2571) 
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THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE. 
UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING 
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
Defendants 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 000900561 
Judae Timothv R. Hanson 
Plaintiff hereby responds to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents as follows. 
appraise the building lot that should have been conveyed to the UGA. A copy of his appraisal is 
attached. 
The UGA may call Mr. Todd B. Jones of Bodell-Van Drimmelen, who appraised the lot for 
the City in September, 1998, as a rebuttal witness. 
INTERROGATORY NO 3: Identify all exhibits you intend to use at the trial of this matter. 
RESPONSE NO. 3: See the accompanying list of Exhibits. 
INTERROGATORY NO. *: State the amount of damages you claim and explain how you 
calculate each element of damages. 
RESPONSE NO. 4: All of the plaintiffs damages have not yet been determined. As of the 
present date, the plaintiff has determined the following damages: 
a. The fair market value of the lot at the agreed upon size that should have been 
transferred to the UGA. This value is set forth in the Christiansen appraisal. 
b. The cost of moving the UGA from its Eaglewood office to its present temporary 
location. This cost is believed to be at least Si 1,903.44. The UGA will also need to move again 
when a permanent location is available that will provide the UGA with a golf course location similar 
to the Eaglewood offices for a time period similar to the remaining period left under the agreement 
with North Salt Lake. Thus, at least another SI 1,903.44 will need to be expended to move into a 
permanent golf course location. Attached hereto are the following bills for the move to temporary 
space, $3,768.22 to Mesa Moving, $2,102.69 to Western Communications to move and reinstall the 
telephone system. $1,217.00 for equipment and furniture and other items necessary to make the 
temporary space useable as an office, and 54,815.53 for reprinting of envelopes and stationary. In 
addition, the UGx\ had to direct the entire time and attention of several of its employees to moving 
the offices for at least a two week period. These employees were Mr. Joe Watts, Mr. Jerry Marks, 
and Ms. Toni Guest. Their salaries during this two week period were $2,308.00. $962.00, and 
$481.00, respectively. Another two weeks will need to be spent by these same employees when the 
UGA relocates into permanent offices. 
c. North Salt Lake's agreement also included space for the Utah Golf Association. Hall 
of Fame. The UGA spent $4,500.00 for display areas for the Hall of Fame, which are useless at its 
new location, Thanksgiving Point Golf Course. A similar amount of money will need to be spent 
for new display cabnits. 
d. The written documents provide for payment of the UGA's court costs, expenses and 
attorney's fees incurred in this action. These costs, fees and expenses will be provided to the Court 
and North Salt Lake in an appropriate fee application. At the present time, they total over 
$10,000.00. 
INTERROGATORY NO 5: Please provide the current address of your offices, the number 
of square feet you are leasing, the term of your current lease, and the amount you pay in rent on a 
square foot basis and on an annual basis. 
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RESPONSE NO 5: This information is irrelevant and not designed to lead to relevant 
information because the UGA is not seeking any damages for the higher rent that the UGA will 
ultimately pay for a permanent location. Notwithstanding, the UGA did not have a permanent office 
site available to it on the short notice allowed by the City's three day notice to vacate. Thus, the 
UGA had to move into a temporary site until a permanent golf course site can be negotiated. The 
UGA is temporarily located ax 9125 South 150 West, Sandy, Utah. The leased property is 
approximately 1300 square feet for which Plaintiff pays $1300 per month on a verbal lease. 
INTERROGATORY NO 6: Please state the different amounts you offered to pay 
defendants to use the Eaglewood golf course clubhouse office space for twenty years, the dates you 
made such offers and whether you claim the amounts offered represented fair market value or less 
than or more than fair market value. Also state other proposed or expected terms of the use 
agreement. 
RESPOMSE NO 6- A number of rates were negotiated. Some were reduced to writing. 
Attached hereto are the letters between the parties. Several of the UGA letters contain offers of lease 
rates. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please state the amount of revenue obtained by plaintiff from 
green fees and golf cart rentals for each day plaintiff had use of the Eaglewood golf course for its 
own tournaments each year the March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement was in effect and in 1999, 
and break out each total into amounts received in green fees and golf cart rentals. 
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RESPONSE NO. 7: The UGA objects to this interrogatory. It seeks information that is not 
relevant and is not likely to lead to relevant information because the UGA is not seeking damages 
for having to pay a higher lease rate for a permanent office at another golf course. Notwithstanding, 
the following revenue was generated under the Eaglewood lease: 1994 - $6,000.00; 1995 -
$7,064.00; 1996 - $5,328.00; 1997 - $5,500.00; 1998 - $5,700.00; 1999 - $3,600.00. No revenue 
was generated from the use of the driving range. The UGA received income of $500,00 per month 
from the middle of 1995 until December 1999 for the sub-lease of the upstairs area. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please state the amount of revenue obtained by plaintiff for 
each year the March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement was in effect and in 1999, and break out each 
total into amounts received in green fees and golf cart rentals. 
RESPONSE NQ, 8: See response to interrogatory No. 7. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please state the amount of revenue you received each year the 
March 31, 1992 Office Use Agreement was in effect and in 1999 from use of the Practice Driving 
Range for plaintiffs Junior Golfers program. 
RESPONSE NO. 9: See response to interrogatory No. 7. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State whether you understood any twenty-year use agreement 
you would enter into the City would continue to include rights for you to the exclusive use of the 
Eaglewood golf course for your own tournaments and the right to retain the green fees and/or part 
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WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., ) 
a Utah nonprofit corporation, ) 
) AFFIDA VIT OF MARY WOOD CANNON 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT ) 
LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal ) 
corporation; and THE CITY OF ) 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, ) Civil No. 000900561 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING ) 
AUTHORITY, a Utah nonprofit ) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
MARY WOOD CANNON, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify concerning the matters set 
forth herein. The matters set forth herein are based on my personal knowledge. 
2. I am a general partner in MRF Family Limited ("MRF'), which is the former 
owner of the land on which much of the Eaglewood Golf Course and surrounding Eaglewood 
subdivision in North Salt Lake City, Utah is presently situated. 
3. Prior to August, 1997, MRF was the owner of a parcel of real property (the 
"MRF Parcel") that is situated adjacent to and northeast of the Eaglewood Golf Course club house. 
4. In August, 1997, MRF conveyed the MRF Parcel to the City by Special 
Warranty Deed, which Special Warranty Deed contained restrictions on the use (the "Use 
Restrictions") of the MRF Parcel. 
5. After the MRF Parcel was conveyed to the City by MRF neither the City nor 
the Utah Golf Association approached MRF about the possibility of removing the Use Restrictions. 
6. Had the City or the Utah Golf Association approached MRF about removing 
the Use Restrictions, MRF would have removed the Use Restrictions. I have been informed that the 
First and Second Addenda to the Office Use Agreement each also contained a right of first refusal 
for the THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, 
a Utah nonprofit corporation, (the "Building Authority") to purchase the MRF Parcel. MRF would 
have removed the Use Restrictions contained in the Special Warranty Deed if the Building Authority 
would have agreed to exercise its right of first refusal. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
a DATED this / ( day of January, 2001. 
Mary WoodTCannon 
Subscribed and sworn to before me a notary public this / ' day of January, 
Notary Public i 
W. SCOTT KJAR 1
 x_ 
563 West 500 South, #300 " -N Otary P u b l 1C 
BounWui U»ahB4010 | 
My Commission Expires
 2 
April 30 2002 1 
State ol Utan * 
w ansa ass amsi aim a w J J » *sy* 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539 
Larry S. Jenkins #4854 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-6060 
Kent L. Christiansen #4207 
Christiansen & Christiansen 
P.O.Box 11751 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
(SOI) 359-3762 
Attorneys for Defendants 
TN TEE THIRD JL'DICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOB. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., ) 
a Utah non-proiit corporation, ) 
) AFFWA YIT OF L, SCOTT GARDNER 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT ) 
LAKE, UTAH, a Utah municipal ) 
corporation; and THE CITY OF ) 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, ) Civil No. 000900561 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING ) 
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit ) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OP DAVIS ) 
L. SCOTT GARDNER, being duly sworn, deposes and says; 
1- I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify concerning the matters set 
forth herein. The matters set lorth herein are based on my personal knowledge, 
2. I am manager of the JEaglewcod golf couise, which is owned by The City 
of North Salt Lake, Utah Municipal Building Authority, and operated by The City of Nonh Salt 
Lake, Utah (the "City*1). One of my responsibilities is to manage the clubhouse at the golf 
course. 
3. After plain tiff Utah Golf Association was evicted from the golf course 
clubhouse in December, 1999. the City took over 1^38 square feet of the 2SS8 square feet 
plaintiff had been using. 
4. The City also leased 1450 square feet of the space plaintiff had used 750 
square feet was leased at Si0.00 per square foot and 700 square feet was leased at $14,50 per 
square foot, 
5. Neither of the parties leasing space at the clubhouse has the right to 
exclusive use of the golf course at any time, nor do they have the right to retain green fees or golf 
can rentals for any day from the golf course. 
2 
[SEAL] I 
Furthei affiant sayelii naught. 
DATED this j ^ S a y of January, 2001. 
L. Scott Gardner 
Subscribed acd swom to before me a notary public this j ^ d a y of January, 2001, 
L*ME H. DfLLJMGHAM 
105 East 475 North 
^ My Commission Bipf.cs K / V ) T y ^ * / ~ 7 
Z February 1.2DGS r ^ - / w t . f > H * * J  2003 
STATE OF UTAH Notary Public 
JiOPivifilrt/rri 
S'\WF1MVA*LEA WNGWORTH SALT UUCtUflA^TODAVITOF SCOTT GAftD!S'£R,wp<i 
3 
LESTER A. PERRY (2571) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH. MUNICIPAL BUILDING 
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
Defendants 
• 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Request for Hearing 
Civil No. 000900561 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
The plaintiff hereby opposes the motion of the defendants for reconsideration of the Court's 
prior grant of summary judgment on liability and opposes the motion of the defendants for summary 
judgment. 
L Introduction. 
obligation to convey title to the lot, which they refused to do. See letters attached hereto as Exhibits. 
The defendants then wrongfully terminated the lease and evicted the UGA in further breach of the 
lease. 
20. Deny. The Addendums speak for themselves. 
21. Admit that the defendants did not have title to the lot at the time the Agreement and 
the Addendums were executed, contrary to the express representations by the defendants in the 
documents that the City of North Salt lake, Utah, Municipal Building Authority (the "Building 
Authority" herein) owned the lot as "fee title owner." Admit that the City obtained the lot by special 
warranty deed from the developer in 1997, a copy of which deed is attached to the memorandum of 
the UGA in support of its prior summary judgment, which deed contains substantial restrictions as 
to the use of the lot and does not convey "fee title" to the Building Authority. Allege that the deed 
speaks for itself as to its terms and use restrictions. 
22. Object to the affidavit of Mary Wood Cannon because: 1) this lawsuit has progressed 
to the point of final witness lists being exchanged and Ms. Cannon is not identified as a witness by 
the City; 2) the City raises this defense, which is an affirmative defense, for the first time in Ms. 
Cannon's affidavit, even though amendments of pleadings are no longer allowed in this case and 
summary judgment on liability has previously been heard; and 3) Ms. Cannon has no foundation to 
testify about speculation about what the developer would have done in 1999, contrary to the express 
5 
use restrictions contained within the developer's deed, and as such, the testimony violates the parol 
evidence rule. 
As demonstrated below, the testimony of Ms. Cannon is irrelevant to any material issue in 
this case. To the extent that her testimony is relevant to the Court, request is hereby made pursuant 
to Rule 56(f) for an opportunity to question the developer's officers who are also closely tied to the 
City and the development of the Eaglewood area. 
23. See response to para. 22. 
24. Deny. The Minute Entry speaks for itself. 
25. Admit. 
26. Admit. This testimony by North Salt Lake's employee, Mr. Scott Gardner, 
demonstrates that the UGA's lease was valuable because it was for 2.178 square feet at $25,000.00 
per year, which equates to $ 11.50 per square foot. Mr. Gardner admits that the fair rental value of 
the premises is $14.50 per square foot. The UGA was wTongfully denied the opportunity to enjoy 
the below market lease because of the defendants' wrongful termination of the lease and eviction of 
the UGA. The difference of $3.00 per foot per year for the 20 year extended term is the measure of 
the UGA's damages. 
27. Admit. This testimony of Mr. Gardner further supports the UGA's claim that it 
enjoyed the benefits of a below market lease and has been further damaged by the defendants' 
wrongful termination of the lease. 
6 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




SUMM JDMT, RELATED MATTERS 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
BENCH TRIAL 
Case No: 000900561 CN 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Date: March 1,2001 
SUMM JDMT, RELATED MATTERS is scheduled. 
Date: 04/16/2001 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. 
Date: 05/22/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 05/29/2001 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 




Case No: 000900561 
Date: Mar 01, 2001 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 05/31/2001 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Summary judgment motion and motion for reconsideration are 
scheduled as indicated herein. 
No discovery completion date set until motions are decited. 
The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not 
be modified without court order, and then only upon a showing of 
manifest injustice. Counsel are instructed to stay in contact with 
the Clerk as the trial date approaches regarding dates. 
Failure to appear at the Final Pretrial Conference may result in a 
default. 
At final pretrial, trial counsel and clients, or an individual with 
authority to settle this case are to be present. Out of state 
parties must be available by phone at the time of the final 
pretrial. 
Page 2 
Case No: 000900561 
Date: Mar 01, 2001 
Dated this / day of yM^^ 
TOOTHY R. HANSON 
D % w * L u ^ u ^ ^ e -5l ^JlTDGE 
Page 3 
Third Jiiv. JL. 'C.^fict 
^
9 *\* 1 £ ' ^ ' M 
By- 0
 bcputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., 
a Utah non-profit corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal 
corporation; and THE CITY OF 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, 
Utah non-profit corporation, 
Defendants• 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 000900561 
The Court has before it defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 17# 
2001. The Court also has before it in addition to the plaintiff fs 
Response to defendants' Motion, a Motion to Strike an Affidavit of 
Mary Wood Cannon. Those Motions were before the Court for oral 
argument on April 16, 2001. At that date and time, counsel for 
both parties appeared and argued their respective positions. 
During the course of the oral argument, the defendants asserted 
that the Court should reconsider this matter and grant their Motion 
for Summary Judgment, which would in effect dismiss the plaintiff's 
Complaint on the basis that the Building Authority did not have the 
legal right to convey title, thus making the contract upon which 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
OF NORTH SALT LAKE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
the plaintiff sues unenforceable. As that matter had not been 
raised in the pleadings up to that point in time, the Court allowed 
the plaintiff an opportunity to file a written Response. The 
defendants were given leave to file a Reply to that Response, and 
then the matter would be decided. 
The Court received the Reply to the plaintiff's Supplemental 
Memorandum regarding Municipal Building Authority issues submitted 
by the defendants on April 27, 2001. Since the filing of that 
final document, the Court has had an opportunity to review the 
Supplemental Memorandum, re-review the documentation in support of 
and in opposition to the defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Reconsideration, as well as the documents submitted and the 
arguments presented in connection with the Motion to Strike the 
Cannon Affidavit. 
Additionally, the Court has re-reviewed its decision entered 
July 14, 2000, wherein the Court granted the plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Finally, the Court has further 
considered oral argument of counsel at the hearing on April 16, 
2 001, and being fully advised, is satisfied that the plaintiff's 
Motion to Strike must be granted for the reasons suggested by the 
plaintiff in its moving papers, and that the defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and Summary Judgment should be denied for the 
reasons set forth by the defendants in both oral argument and in 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
OF NORTH SALT LAKE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
its responsive papers filed following the defendants1 Motion for 
Reconsideration and Summary Judgment. 
In addition to all of the foregoing, the Court observes and is 
persuaded that while there is no such Motion under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure that allow for a Motion for Reconsideration, that 
this Court has inherent authority as long as it has jurisdiction 
over a matter to reconsider an Order previously entered. In other 
words, if the Court becomes aware after entering a particular Order 
that it was issued in error, based on something such as discovery 
of a controlling case directly on point from one of Utahfs 
appellate courts, the trial Court ought not to have to stand on a 
clear error by not revisiting the matter. 
A Motion for Reconsideration, however, should and must be 
limited. In this case, the plaintiff brought its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment seeking to resolve the issue of liability 
as raised in its Complaint, leaving only for hearing the question 
of damages sustained for breach of the agreement between the 
plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants had ample opportunity 
in responding to that Motion for Summary Judgment to raise the 
issues they now raise as new items. Clearly, the defendants1 now 
raised position of there being inadequate consideration is an issue 
that could have easily been raised in the original Motion for 
Summary Judgment brought by the plaintiff. The defendants' 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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position that the Court's decision in July of 2000, that the 
defendants were unable to lift the restrictions on the lot to be 
transferred was premature, could have also been raised at the 
original Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally, as to the Building 
Authority's ability to transfer property, that again is an issue 
that could have been raised at the original Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Defendants failed to raise those issues initially, and 
should not now be permitted to continually raise new legal issues 
in an attempt to avoid a previously granted Summary Judgment that 
could have and should have been raised at the original Motion for 
Summary Judgment. To the extent that a Motion for Reconsideration 
exists at all, it does not exist for the purpose of raising new 
legal arguments that were not raised in an original Motion. 
For the foregoing reasons alone, the defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration should be denied, which would of course include the 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court has, however, considered the merits of the 
defendants' argument and is not persuaded that the legal arguments 
asserted are such that a Motion for Summary Judgment would lie in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff even if it was 
proper to reconsider the original granting of Summary Judgment to 
the plaintiff. The Court finds the plaintiff's positions and 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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responses to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
persuasive. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to reconsider 
this matter. Further, even if the Court were to accept the 
defendants' request to reconsider a previously granted Summary 
Judgment, the defendants are not entitled to Summary Judgment on 
the basis of the materials submitted. 
Counsel for the plaintiff should prepare an appropriate Order 
showing that the Motion to Strike is granted, and showing that the 
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, and^the defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment are denied. 
The Order should be submitted in §rfccordance with the Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., 
a Utah non-profit corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal 
corporation; and THE CITY OP 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, i 
Utah non-profit corporation, 
Defendants• 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 000900561 
This matter was before the Court for trial on May 30, 2001. 
The parties were present through their authorized representatives 
and represented by counsel. Counsel made opening statements, both 
the plaintiff and the defendant offered evidence, and counsel made 
closing arguments. At the conclusion of closing arguments, the 
Court took the matter under advisement. 
Since taking this matter under advisement, the Court has 
reviewed all the evidence offered and received, considered the 
respective positions of the parties, and being fully advised, 
enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
OF NORTH SALT LAKE PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This is an action for breach of contract. The issue of the 
breach was resolved on plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment in accordance with this Courtfs Minute Entry of July 14, 
2000. The defendant moved the Court to reconsider its granting of 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 17, 2001, and 
that request for reconsideration was denied by this Court's Minute 
Entry on May 15, 2001. 
The issue before the Court at trial was the damages, if any, 
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the defendants1 breach. 
The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a series of 
agreements for plaintiff to lease portions of a building to be 
constructed on a new golf course being designed and built by the 
defendant in conjunction with a surrounding residential 
development. Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 constitute the agreement. In 
relevant summary, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would lease 
for five years, and at the end of that term would negotiate in good 
faith for a more lengthy 20 year lease. 
As an inducement to enter into the 2 0-year lease at the end of 
the five-year lease, and fcr plaintiff locating its facility at the 
golf course clubhouse, defendant agreed to provide a building lot 
east of the clubhouse that would be approximately 18,975 square 
feet. The property in the agreements was not legally described, 
but the evidence during the course of the trial shows that all 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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parties understood that the lot would be located adjacent to the 
east side of the clubhouse parking lot, fronting on a residential 
road going into the developing subdivision. 
As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties 
started negotiations for a long-term lease. It became clear that 
the defendant did not hold title to the subject lot that would make 
it marketable to third parties, because of restrictions in the deed 
requiring that it be used for a golf Hall of Fame or as a golf 
course. The City's deed provided that failure to use the property 
for either one of those uses would cause it to revert to the City's 
grantor. 
The initial lease expired. The plaintiff became a month-to-
month tenant. The problems with the deed restrictions on the lot 
could not be resolved. Plaintiff refused to enter into a long-term 
lease without the defendant deeding the lot. 
The defendant was agreeable to entering into a long-term lease 
and continue to negotiate on the lot. Eventually, the defendant 
terminated the month-to-month tenancy with the plaintiff and served 
a Notice to Quit, with an effective date of December 31, 1999. 
Plaintiff relocated at the end of 1999, and this lawsuit followed. 
The principal question before the Court is the value of the 
lot the defendant was obligated to deliver. The plaintiff also 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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seeks damages consequential to its' relocating from the golf course. 
Those relocation expenses include: 
1. Moving costs (past and future) 
2. Employee salaries during the moving period 
3. Telephone system relocation expenses 
4. Office stationery expenses, including other minor items 
such as property left at the defendant's site when the plaintiff 
moved, and some materials that could not be used in the new space 
owned by the plaintiff. 
As to the damages sought by plaintiff's relocation, the Court 
finds that those were not reasonably incurred, or are speculative, 
or constitute fixtures under the lease which became the defendant's 
property when the plaintiff left. 
The evidence clearly shows that the defendant's serving the 
plaintiff with a Notice to Quit was the result of plaintiff's 
refusal to discuss the terms of the 20 year lease and reserve the 
lot issue for further resolution. The plaintiff did not have to 
move and incurred the expenses that it did, nor did the plaintiff 
have to Lose the benefits it acquired at the defendant's golf 
course. The plaintiff easily could have renegotiated the long-term 
lease, and then pursued the lot issue, either through negotiations 
or other legal evidence. There is no indication that mutually 
acceptable terms for a 20-year lease could not have been reached if 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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the lot issue had been separately reserved. In the final analysis, 
the plaintiff would have to pay rent for its activities at some 
location, and in fact does, since this move. 
Even though the defendant was not able to provide the lot 
promised or other substitute compensation, the plaintiff had a duty 
to reasonably mitigate its losses for the breach. A reasonable 
approach would have been to enter into satisfactory terms for a 20-
year lease and deal with the lot at a later time. As the plaintiff 
has failed to reasonably mitigate its damages, it cannot now 
recover the relocation expenses and other claimed consequential 
damages related to its move. 
In addition to the foregoing, the plaintifffs evidence on 
costs of future moves are speculative and do not meet the 
evidentiary threshold to show loss, even if failure to mitigate did 
not apply. The same is true with the claims of salaries paid 
during a relocation period. Those were not shown to be exclusively 
related to the move, and that those salaries would have been paid 
in any event. The items left behind to which the plaintiff seeks 
damages, such as the television satellite dish became, under the 
terms of the lease, fixtures belong to the defendant. The 
plaintiff's claim that the current space does not allow use of 
promotional materials is not related to the move, but rather the 
size of the current rental space. Accordingly, on the items listed 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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above, even had the plaintiff not failed to reasonably mitigate 
damages, those items would not be recoverable. 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff's claim for damages 
related to relocation following the Notice to Quit are denied. 
Turning to the issue of the building lot, the Court notes that 
the agreements between the parties provided that the defendant 
will, as part of the 20-year lease agreement, provide plaintiff 
with a lot east of the clubhouse parking area. But for the 
restrictions on the deed held by the defendant, the Court is 
satisfied that a 20-year lease could have been negotiated. 
The documents showing the agreement between the plaintiff and 
the defendant provide, among other things as it relates to the lot, 
that plaintiff may build on the lot or, if not, sell the lot, 
giving the defendant a first right of refusal. 
The plaintiff was entitled to a lot that would be marketable 
to a third party. The defendant cannot provide such a title, in 
that the deed that it holds has restrictions that show that the 
property reverts to tha grantor if the property is not used by the 
plaintiff as a Hall of Fame or used as a golf course. Accordingly, 
if the defendant transferred title to the plaintiff with the 
current deed restrictions, the plaintiff could not sell the 
property and realize the proceeds therefrom if it decided not to 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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build a Hall of Fame on the property. The plaintiff would lose a 
significant benefit in the agreement struck between the parties. 
The plaintiff asks for damages for the inability of the 
defendant to produce a deed without the severe restrictions on the 
lot promised. The plaintiff is entitled to the value of what it 
bargained for, that is, a lot that could be sold for its highest 
and best use which, in the area where the lot is located, is 
residential. 
The Court determines the fair market value of the lot in 
question at $158,441. The Court determines based on the evidence 
received that $8.35 per square foot is an appropriate valuation of 
the raw land, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a lot that 
included 18,975 square feet. 
Further, the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as 
of the effective date of the Notice to Quit, to wit: the day 
following the effective date of the Notice to Quit, that is, 
January 1, 2000. 
Concerning the issue of attorney's fees, the Court recalls 
that the parties agreed that the Court would make a determination 
of attorney's fees following a decision on the merits. While the 
plaintiff has not prevailed on all portions of its claim, it has 
prevailed on the single most important issue, which is the lot. 
Accordingly, the Court determines that the plaintiff is entitled 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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under the terms of the contract to its reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs. In that regard, plaintiff's counsel may submit an 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs, the amount of attorney's 
fees must be noted by hourly rate# with proper foundation for 
establishing the rate to be reasonable, together with an hourly 
itemized account of time spent relating to this case. The 
defendant will have ten days from the date of submission of the 
attorney's fees and costs Affidavit to file an Objection if it so 
chooses as to the amount of fees requested, not the entitlement. 
Finally, plaintiff's counsel is to prepare a detailed set of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. The Court 
expects that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will be 
in-depth, and are not necessarily limited to the words of this 
Memorandum Decision. This Memorandum Decision is summary in 
fashion and designed only to provide the parties with a summary 
basis of the Court's determination. The Court will look forward to 
the required Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment, and 
Attorney's Fee Affidavit which, as indicated above, should all be 
submitted in accordance with the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Third Judioial District 
OCT 1 0 2001 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., 
a Utah non-profit corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal 
corporation; and THE CITY OF 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, \ 
Utah non-profit corporation, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 000900561 
The Court has before it a request for decision seeking a 
decision on the defendants1 objections to Plaintiff's Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the defendants 
Objections to plaintiff's requested attorney's fees, litigation 
expenses and court costs. 
The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers on 
both issues and being fully advised, enters the following Minute 
Entry decision and Order. 
The Court overrules the Objections to the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court is satisfied that they 
adequateLy reflect the determinations of the Court as contained in 
the Court's Minute Entry decision of July 19, 2001. The Court has 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
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signed and caused to be entered the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in the form presented by counsel for the 
plaintiff. 
As to the Objections to the requested attorneyfs fees and 
costs, the Court determines that the requested fees are excessive 
in part. 
The plaintiff is entitled to fees for all matters relating to 
the issue of liability as determined by the first Summary Judgment, 
and also fees in responding to the Motion for Reconsideration. The 
plaintiff is entitled to fees for the preparation for trial as it 
relates to the value of the property only, and the trial time and 
post-trial time related to the value of the property. Any time 
that has been spent by plaintiff's counsel dealing with the claimed 
damages that were disallowed, either in preparation for trial or at 
the time of trial, would be inappropriate. 
Accordingly, counsel for the plaintiff is to review the work 
performed and provide a further document showing how the fees have 
been calculated as it relates to the issue of liability, the Motion 
to Reconsider, and the trial and post-trial matters relating to 
value of the property only. The Court cannot tell from the 
plaintiff's response to the defendants1 Objection regarding 
attorney's fees if the items listed there are the only items that 
should be reduced. Once those items have been /moved from the 
UTAH GOLF V. CITY 
OF NORTH SALT LAKE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
requested fees, the Court will grant the remaining fees as 
plaintiff's reasonable and necessary attorneyfs fees in this 
matter. 
As to the defendants1 Objections to costs for the security 
bond and the defendants1 Objections to the expert valuations costs 
that were not admitted into evidence, the Court finds those to be 
improperly included on litigation expenses or court costs, and 
those items should be deleted from the plaintiff's court costs 
and/or litigation expenses. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court returns the original 
Judgment to counsel for the plaintiff and after appropriate 
calculations have been made, the Court will enter a Judgment 
setting forth the attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court 
costs. The fees, litigation expenses and court costs should be 
dealt with in separate paragraphs so it is clear what is being 
sought and the amount being awarded. 
Once the Judgment has been redone in accordance with the 
Court's instructions contained herein, they should be submitted to 
the Court for review and signature. 
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As to the defendants' Objections to fees, costs and Findings, 
this Minute Entry will stand as the/Court's Order in relation 
thereto. No further Order is required. 
Dated this lt> dav of October, 2001. 
?IM0THY R. HANSON ,, , 
' DISTRICT COURT^JUDGE J' o» . 
JbmoU l^y 
LESTER A. PERRY (2571) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
F1L1D DISTRICT COURT 
ThW Judicial District 
OCT \ 0 2001 
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THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING 
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation. 
Defendants 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
Civil No. 000900561 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Having decided the issue of the existence of a contract between the parties and the 
defendants' breach of the contract on summary judgment in its minute entry of July 14,2000, which 
minute entry was incorporated in the Partial Summary Judgment entered on August 7, 2000; having 
declined to grant the defendants' motion for reconsideration and the defendants' summary judgment 
in its minute entry of May 15, 2001; and having conducted a bench trial on the issue of damages on 
May 30, 2001; the Court makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Findings of Fact 
1. The plaintiff, the Utah Golf Association (referred to herein as the "UGA") is an 
organization representing amateur golf in the state of Utah. 
2. The defendant, the City of North Salt Lake, Utah (referred to herein as "North Salt 
Lake"), is a municipal corporation. 
3. The defendant, the City of North Salt Lake, Utah, Municipal Building Authority, is 
a municipal building authority created by North Salt Lake. 
4. The defendants constructed a new golf course, called Eaglewood Golf Course, and 
a club house. 
5. On or about March 31, 1992, the parties entered into an agreement entitled "Office 
Use Agreement" (referred to herein as the "Agreement"). 
6. The Agreement executed by the parties included a "First Addendum to Office Use 
Agreement" (referred to herein as the "First Addendum"). 
7. On or about January 3,1994, the parties executed a "Second Addendum to Office Use 
Agreement (referred to herein as the "Second Addendum"). 
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8. The parties agreed within the Agreement, First Addendum and Second Addendum 
that the UGA would lease its offices at the club house from North Salt Lake for a term of five years, 
and at the end of that term would negotiate in good faith for a 20 year lease. 
9. As an inducement for the UGA relocating its offices and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame 
to the club house; as an inducement to entering into the agreements; and as an inducement to enter 
into a 20 year lease extension; North Salt Lake agreed to convey fee title to the UGA in an 18,975 
square foot building lot that was just east of the club house parking lot. fronting on a residential 
street leading into the adjacent, developing subdivision. 
10. As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for a long-
term lease. 
11. The UGA desired to exercise its rights under the First Addendum and enter into a 20 
year lease. However, the UGA required the City to obtain release of the use restrictions in the deed 
and stand ready to deed "fee title" in the building lot to the UGA that could be marketable to third 
parties. 
12. During these negotiations, it became clear that North Salt Lake did not hold title to 
the subject lot that would make it marketable to third parties because of use restrictions in the deed 
that North Salt Lake received from the original developer. 
13. Between March, 1999 and December, 1999, the parties tried to resolve the problem 
caused by the use restrictions on the lot. 
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14. The defendants did not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot. 
15. The initial lease expired and the UGA became a month-to-month tenant. 
16. North Salt Lake was agreeable to entering into a long-term lease and continue to 
negotiate on the lot. The UGA required North Salt Lake to be able to convey the lot free and clear 
from the use restrictions before entering into a new lease. 
17. But for the use restrictions on the lot, the parties would have successfully negotiated 
a 20-year lease. 
18. North Salt Lake terminated the month-to-month tenancy of the UGA and evicted the 
UGA from its offices on December 31, 1999. 
19. The UGA complied with the eviction notice and vacated its offices at the Eaglewood 
golf course. 
20. The UGA incurred costs in moving its offices, salaries for employees involved with 
the move, expenses associated with relocating its telephone system, costs of new stationary with a 
new address, and miscellaneous expenses associated with the move, primanly the cost of items that 
had to be left at the club house or could not be used at the UGA's new site. 
21. The value of the lot, if it did not have the use restrictions, was $158,441.00 on the 
effective date of the eviction, January 1, 2000. 
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Conclusions of Law 
1. The defendants breached the lease by not being able to convey unrestricted, fee title 
to the lot that could be marketed to third parties. 
2. The costs incurred in moving the UGA offices were not reasonably incurred, wrere 
speculative, or were caused by the failure of the UGA to mitigate its damages. 
3. The items left at the club house by the UGA were fixtures under the lease and became 
the property of North Salt Lake when the UGA moved out. 
4. The UGA was damaged by not being able to obtain what it bargained for, the value 
of the lot at its highest and best use, which was residential, without any use restrictions. 
5. The UGA prevailed on the single, most important issue in this case, which was breach 
of the lease by the defendants and the loss of the value of the lot because of the breach. 
6. The UGA is entitled to its attorney's fees that were reasonably incurred in this action 
and to its court costs. * 
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l^/.CED 
LESTER A. PERRY (2571) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-8000 
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OF JUCG/sENTyS 
/17147/01 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah 
non-profit corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE. 
UTAH, a Utah municipal corporation; and 
THE CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, 
UTAH, MUNICIPAL BUILDING 
AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
Defendants 
Judgment 
Civil No. 000900561 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
The Court having entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, hereby enters this 
judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: 
1. For $158,441.00; 
2. For prejudgment interest thereon at 10 % per annum from January 1, 2000 through 
the date of this judgment; 
3. For attorney's fees and litigation expenses of $20,974.00. 
4. For court costs of $204.00 and litigation expenses of $516.31, totaling $720.31; 
5. For post judgment interest on the total money judgment of $180,135.31 at 7.34% per 
annum. 
Df-6etobcT;: DATED this / j day of •Oct er, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
r - ,. v. 
imothv R. Hanson^ '* "«-• 
District Judge ^ ^ , 
'-aca»-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, 
in Civil No. 000900561, postage prepaid, thisJ&T day of October, 2001 to: 
Larry S. Jenkins 
WOODCRAPO 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 
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1775 E.Ellen Way 
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1 j everything that it paid out under the agreement. 
2 I would like to mention one other issue on this part 
3 of our motion, your Honor. I guess it's one of those you 
4 could — I guess you should call it a forest-for-the-trees 
5 issue. As I was preparing for argument, I noted the way the 
6 contracts are set up, it recites that the Building Authority 
7 I was the party that held title to this lot, and of course there 
8 was some problem with that representation, as the Court found 
9 last year. It also provides — 
10 THE COURT: Well, it's true. 
11 MR. JENKINS: It is true. It is true. I'm just 
12 J saying this is the way the agreement is written. But the way 
13 the agreement was also written is the Building Authority was to 
14 j be the one to transfer the lot, or was to sell the lot and give 
15 the proceeds, I guess, to the UGA. But under the Municipal 
16 j Building Authority Act, a building authority is only empowered j 
17 to acquire, improve, or extend one or more projects and finance ' 
18 their cost on behalf of the public body. They're entitled also' 
19 to enter into leasing contracts with the public body that 
2 0 created them. But nowhere in the act is there any authority i 
21 for a municipal building authority to dispose of property, by 
22 sale or otherwise, to anyone other than the public body that j 
23 created it. And that is generally pursuant to a leasing 
24 contract. 
25 So I guess the point is, not only was this 
11 
1 I transaction ultra vires in that there was no consideration 
2 contemplated at all for this building lot, but the Building 
3 Authority had no authority to transfer the property to anyone 
4 other than the city, and then only pursuant to a leasing 
5 contract, according to the Municipal Building Authority Act, 
6 I THE COURT: So if you deal with some governmental 
7 I agency that claims to have authority and agrees to do things 
that it cannot legally do, you do so at your own risk? 
9 | MR. JENKINS: I think to some extent you do, your 
10 Honor. I think you need to -
11 THE COURT: Why does that strike me as inordinately 
12 I unfair? 
I I 
13 MR. JENKINS: Well - and I can understand your point, | 
i 
14 I your Honor, but I think here, where you have a situation where I 
15 the agreement is entirely lopsided on UGA's side, you have a | 
16 situation where the only thing they're paying for is office 
17 space. They're paying rent on office space, and yet supposedly 
18 they're getting all of these other things, including transfer 
19 I of what they claim to be a $190,000 building lot. 
20 I understand the city entered into that — or, you 
21 know, signed that agreement, but at the same time the city is 
22 charged with protecting the interests and the property that 
23 belongs to it on behalf of the people. That property is held 
24 in trust. And if the city, after something is done as far as a 
25 I contract or otherwise that suggests that that is not a 
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1 i governing the parties, the issue of the defect on the title may 
2 t be irrelevant, and probably shouldn't be the determining factor 
3 in this case on whether there was an anticipatory repudiation. 
4 Let me go through what the course of negotiations 
5 | were, and perhaps the Court will understand my point. First of 
6 J all, in the agreement the Building Authority, of course, was 
7 the party that — it said in there was the party that held the 
8 property, and it was the one that was going to transfer the 
9 property. The Building Authority also reserved a right of 
10 I first refusal to purchase the property should a sale occur such 
11 that the proceeds go to the UGA. 
12 Now, all of the negotiations that preceded the 
13 December 8th, 1999 letter that UGA relies upon shows that the 
14 j parties were actually trying to negotiate the price of the lot 
15 into the deal. In fact, that went on for several months. It 
16 j was raised early on, and there are a few attempts throughout 
17 the summer and into September in 1999 to actually negotiate the 
18 value of the lot into the deal. 
19 On December 7th, 1999, after several months of no 
20 communications between the parties, the city council decided to 
21 sever negotiations. Now, mysteriously, the UGA then sends 
22 their December 8th letter the very next day, after there hadn't 
23 been communications for a few months, offering a different 
24 deal, a significant price increase, but also demanding the lot 
25 be transferred to it free and clear. 
21 
1 J I recognize that there were some discussions earlier 
2 about the restrictions being taken off the deed then, but there 
3 was no discussion in the Deceimoer 8th letter about the prior 
4 negotiations that had gone where the value of the lot was 
5 essentially being considered and negotiated as part of the 
6 deal. It appears to me that the UGA probably was aware of the 
7 I city council's decision the night before and probably wanted to 
8 J do something to try and improve its position* 
9 But before receiving the December 8th letter, and 
10 without referencing it, the city attorney then sent the 
11 | December 9th letter from the city canceling negotiations. Now, 
12 it seems to me, given the course of negotiations and the facts 
13 underlying those, that a question of fact exists whether an 
14 encumbrance could have been a repudiation, or whether or not it 
15 j was even irremediable, or I think whether it was relevant. 
16 I think the question is further heightened by the 
17 fact that the lot was, as I indicated earlier, supposedly held 
18 and was to be conveyed by the Building Authority. The Building 
19 Authority by statute could only sell the lot to the city. 
20 Where the city was the only possible buyer, and where the 
21 Building Authority had a right of first refusal, I think the 
22 fact that there was a defect in the title becomes much less 
23 significant, particularly where all along the city was trying 
24 to negotiate the price of the lot into the deal all along. And 
25 I so I think that really places an issue of fact as to where the 
22 
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Utah Golf v. North Salt Lake May 30, 2001 Bench Trial 
1 MR. PERRY: I must admit that there is no testimony 
2 that says I had to give up handling this golf tournament or I 
3 had to give up handling this sales campaign for new members. 
4 You're correct. I must say that. The only testimony that 
5 exists is that they spent their time, pretty much full time for 
6 this two week period and that's what they were paid. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 MR. PERRY: We have a television dish that the UGA 
9 paid half of that the UGA didnt cause a problem, say we want 
10 that dish. They simply left but they lost their half of the 
11 dish for $1,140. They just left it up to Eaglewood. There was 
12 a counter and a door very similar to what's around the court 
13 here that was specially made for the specific dimensions of the 
14 UGA property that cant be used. It's in storage and they paid 
15 $1,029 for that counter. 
16 The Hall of Fame has a central display cabinet. It 
17 was a walk around cabinet, very large. It has special glass 
18 windows all around it. It houses some of the better 
19 memorabilia of Utah golf and that cabinet was built for the 
20 specific area at the Eaglewood area which is large enough to 
21 have you walk around the area. It cannot be used and is not 
22 being used at the present site, and the cost of that was 
23 $4,965. These were the initial damages that were incurred 
24 because of the move. 
25 There is one other thing that is going to have to 
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1 happen. The UGA is in a place that is about 60 percent the 
2 size of where it was and what it needs and it is in a non-golf 
3 course location. It prefers the golf course location. It 
4 could not find an appropriate place at the time within the 
5 three days that it had to move. There are two particular 
6 damages that are going to have to be repeated, particularly the 
7 moving expense and the telephone. It's going to be a very 
8 similar cost to move them from the place they're in now. It's 
9 the same amount of ftirniture, the same amount of documents, 
10 stationary, and move from where it is now out to another golf 
11 course location. It's going to be very similar to tear down 
12 the same telephone system out of its present place, move it 
13 into the new place. And in likelihood, the same amount of time 
14 is going to have to be spent by the UGA employees in handling 
15 this move. The UGA would ask this Court to reimburse it for 
16 these costs, these expenses of the move. 
17 Your Honor, these costs and expenses were incurred in 
18 December of'99, the middle part of December of'99 and we 
19 believe that prejudgment interest should be added to the cost 
20 and expenses that are ultimately awarded by the Court. The 
21 only other item is attorney's fees which we discussed. Well 
22 wait and see who is the prevailing party and (inaudible). 
23 Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you. 
25 Mr. Jenkins? 
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1 MR. JENKINS: Your Honor, in a case like this where a 
2 party is claiming a breach of contract, the typical standard of 
3 recovery of damage is the benefit of the bargain. And as I 
4 understand the benefit of the bargain as the value of what the 
5 contract was going to bring to the non-breaching party, less 
6 what they were supposed to pay, less again expenses that are 
7 avoided by not having to perform. 
8 In this case, the UGA has asked for the full value of 
9 the lot which Mr. Perry now states is about $158,000 based on 
10 the size of the lot, and by implication, because he didn't 
11 state what the UGA was supposed to pay for that lot, I assume 
12 that means he thinks the UGA was suppose to get it without 
13 paying anything which I think supports the argument we made 
14 previously in the motion for summary judgment, that there was 
15 no consideration contemplated for this lot. But beside that, 
16 you also have to look at the expenses that are avoided, the 
17 costs that are avoided by not having to perform, essentially 
18 looking at what would the parties have had to pay out had they 
19 gone ahead and completed the agreement as contemplated. 
20 In this case, the UGA was supposed to have entered 
21 into a 20 year lease, that's a cost that they've avoided. They 
22 dont have to do that now or they haven't done that with the 
23 city and the Court has ruled that, of course, that was a 
24 condition that was excused, but I think in calculating damages, 
251 think the Court still needs to take that into account. 
139 
1 The testimony today has shown that right now UGA is 
2 paying a little less than, about $14,400 a year which is more 
3 than $10,000 less than what they were paying at the clubhouse, 
4 suggesting that they have avoided at least that much over the 
5 last year and a half and possibly into the future. We dont 
6 know exactly where that's going to play out. They've certainly 
7 avoided those costs and I think that needs to be taken into 
8 consideration in placing a value on what it is that the UGA is 
9 entitled to for damages. 
10 I thinks some other things need to be taken into 
11 account as well. Mr. Perry adjusts the VanGremlin appraisal 
12 upward because of the size of the lot that was contemplated way 
13 back in 1992, but as the evidence has shown today, way back in 
14 1992 this was raw ground. There were no roads involved or 
15 anything like that and it was contemplated, it was important to 
16 Mr. Watts that there be a road in front of where the lot went. 
17 Typically as I understand real estate law if you've got raw 
18 land and you've got a lot, if you put a road through it and 
19 dedicate that to the city, sometimes that chops off the front 
20 of the lot and that may compensate for the area that that was 
21 missing, the difference between the 18,975 feet and the 17,768 
22 feet. 
23 THE COURT: Does that appraisal say this? 
24 MR. JENKINS: Pardon? 
25 THE COURT: Does the appraisal say that? 
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!oc Watts 
August 23. 1999 
Mayor Jim Dixon 
North Salt Lake City Offices 
North Salt Lake, Utah 
Dear Mayor Dixon: 
At our meeting last week you suggested that it might be helpful to the negotiating process 
if the UGA would suggest the terms of a lease agreement that would be acceptable to us. 
and that we could work from that point. You suggested that we should consider including 
the price of the lot into the monthly lease payments. 
With that in mind we would propose a lease of S16.000 per year for ten years plus two 
days of use of the golf course each year. This proposal includes the purchase of the lot. 
We arrive at this figure based on the current lease rate of S25.000 per year, plus a 3% 
increase each year for the extended term, plus S80.000 for the lot, plus a 10% interest per 
annum. 
We are suggesting a reduced length in the lease because it is probably in both of our 
interests. 
Please get back to us as soon as possible. 
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September 8, 1999 
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Dear Mr, Baxter; 
I have reviewed your proposal dated August 23, 1999 with the North Salt Lake City 
Council. The City Council has requested that I convey a counteroffer relative to a new lease 
with the Utah Golf Association at the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse. 
The City would propose to lease to the UGA approximately 2,178 square feet of office 
space at the Eaglewood Golf Course Clubhouse at the initial annual rate of 330,000.00, with 
annual increases in rent of 3% for a term of twenty (20) years. The City Council is also willing 
to include as pan of the lease arrangement, the right of the UGA to use the Eaglewood Golf 
Course for two (2) Monday mornings each year for the purpose of conducting their own 
tournament. 
In addition, upon executing the twenty (20) year lease, the City would agree to acquire 
the resulting interest the UGA would have in the subject lot adjacent to the clubhouse for the 
value 5100,000.00. The 5100,000.00 would be paid over the period of the twenty (20) year 
lease via a rent reduction of 55,000.00 per year. No interest would accrue on the acquisition 
price of the subject lot. 
The UGA's lease at Eaglewood expired about eight months ago. The City would like 
to continue to have the association with the UGA at the golf course, an association which has 
been positive for the past five plus years. It is, however, critical for the parties to resolve the 
future of the lease at the club house. The City Council has requested that the UGA respond to 
the above counterproposal no later than October 1, 1999. The above counteroffer is to be 
considered a final offer. In the event that wc are unable to reach an agreement as to the 
substantive terms of the lease by October 1, 1999, the City will need to know of the UGA's 
intentions concerning construction of a building on the premises, and/or the UGA's relocation. 
Douglas A. Baxter 
UTAH GOLF ASSOCIATION 
Septembers, 1999 
Page 2 
We appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and Joe Watts, and your efforts to 
resolve this issue. The City is hopeful that we may expeditiously finalize the matter and that 
the parties may continue their association at the North Salt Lake Eaglewood Golf Course. 
KLC/moc 






April 10, 1999 
(This is a personal communication from Joe Watts to Scon Gardner. It she J d be made 
clear that Joe Watts does not have the authority to enter into any binding agreements on 
this matter and that his thoughts and suggestions are just an attempt to get the lease 
negotiations between the two parties off of dead center Joe Watts musfget board 
approval before entering into any agreements. These comments are his personal thoughts 
and are not necessarily reflective of the UGA board position.) 
Dear Scott: 
We were sought out. invited, and encouraged to move to Eaglewood Golf Course by the 
developers and North Salt Lake City. It was a joint effort by Steve Smoot. Jake Simmons, 
and Colin Wood. The UGA was also being courted with an attractive offer from SLC to 
join with them in the new office building at Forest Dale. 
In order to secure our presence and add credibility to their project North Salt Lake made a 
very attractive offer to us. Many of the specific terms of the agreement were made by 
North Salt Lake to ^induce" us to enter into the agreement. 
In addition to below market rental space and some free space for the Hall of Fame, North 
Salt Lake offered to give the UGA a warranty deed to an adjacent piece of property. A 
special clause of the agreement makes it very clear that the UGA had the option to sell 
the property and retain the proceeds from the sale. The agreement mentions several 
specific restrictions, but does not mention that the UGA would have to get permission 
from anyone else to sell the property, or that we would have to share the proceeds with 
any other party. 
Similar properties have sold at $165,000. The appraisal commissioned by North Salt 
Lake places a value of 5150,000 on the lot. 
We have met the terms of our agreement and feel that North Salt Lake is obligated to 
give us the warranty deed so that we can resell the property and retain all the proceeds. 
When we find a buyer North Salt Lake has first right of refusal. 
The restrictive clause that has been put on the property by an agreement between the 
developer and the city was not approved by the UGA, was added after North Salt Lake 
had entered in the agreement with the UGA, and in fact, the UGA had no knowledge that 
such an agreement existed between the city and the developer until just a few months 
ago. 
As to the particulars of the lease agreement it is clear that North Salt Lake wanted our 
agreement to be long term. North Salt Lake offered the UGA the choice of building an 
office building, or reselling the property and remaining as a tenant for 20 years. When the 
two parties signed the original agreement the terms of the extended 20-year lease were 
considered. North Salt Lake wanted to protect itself against the possibilities of inflation 
and so the UGA agreed to accept a three- percent annual increase for the extended term 
of the lease. Otherwise there were to be no changes in the extended lease agreement. The 
UGA would not have entered into an agreement that imposed exorbitant increases in an 
extended term of the lease. The intent was clear that the UGA would continue to receive 
similar lease considerations. 
The UGA has already indicated to North Salt Lake an intent to exercise its option to 
resell the property, and as the previous agreement requires, the UGA is also willing to 
sign a 20-year lease with a three percent annual increase for the next 20 years. 
If North Salt Lake would like to purchase the property from the UGA at this point in time 
I think I can persuade the UGA Board to accept 50% of its appraised value. The 
appraised value, as determined by the city's appraisal is SI50,000, which makes the 
selling price just $75,000 to the city. 
If the city does not want to buy it at this time it will present the city, the developer, and 
the UGA with a question of how to deal with the restrictive agreement currently clouding 
the deed to the property. The restrictive agreement between Nonh Salt Lake and the 
developer is a moot point if the city decides to purchase the property from the UGA. We 
would like to keep it a moot point and so we encourage the city to purchase the property 
now rather than wait for a first right of refusal later, which in all likelihood will be 
considerably higher than the $75,000. One of the reasons I suggest such a big discount on 
the property is to help all the parties avoid the necessity of facing the restrictive deed 
dilemma. 
You and I need to work this out in such a way that there are no hard feelings between the 
UGA and Nonh Salt Lake. I'm hoping that we can cut through the posturing, and that the 
two of us can quickly come to a win-win agreement. 
Thanks, 
Jo-
